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This Article is the first legal scholarship to analyze domestic violence civil
protection orders and response systems using the Stages of Change Model
from the field of psychology. The Stages of Change Model, which describes
how domestic violence survivors end relationship violence, includes five
stages: (1) pre-contemplation; (2) contemplation; (3) preparation; (4)
action; and (5) maintenance. According to the model, ending intimate
partner violence is an iterative and complex process, and survivors
typically revisit earlier stages as they progress toward maintaining freedom
from violence. The model has been validated by numerous studies and is
widely accepted in the psychology community. As a result, it is a powerful
tool for evaluating the legal treatment of domestic violence.
A heightened focus on the civil protection order remedy is warranted
because of its potential to increase the domestic violence survivor’s safety
and autonomy, unlike recent mandatory criminal policies that give control
over arrest and prosecution decisions to the state without regard to a
survivor’s belief about how the action will affect her safety. The civil
protection order is also the remedy that survivors most often choose to
address the violence. An exploration of the individual stages in the Stages of
Change Model, however, reveals deficiencies in the protection order
remedy and suggests procedural rule reforms, substantive law changes, and
improvements to legal and advocacy interventions. For example, while
current procedural rules and judicial practices penalize petitioners for
seeking the court’s assistance multiple times, I propose rule changes that
would allow petitioners to access the legal system designed to protect them.
The Article also offers economic and safety justifications for advocacy
support across the stages in response to the current system’s failure to
address survivors’ safety planning needs in the preparation stage and the
emotional and tangible resources they need to sustain an end to violence in
the maintenance stage. Among other legal reforms, I identify substantive
law changes necessary to the maintenance stage, such as making monetary
relief statutorily available in protection orders to enable low-income or
economically dependent survivors to end violent relationships. The
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advancements inspired by using the lens of the Stages of Change Model
would enable civil protection orders to better respond to survivors’ actual
experiences and needs and encourage survivors’ progression through the
stages to achieve freedom from violence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past several decades of domestic violence reform have centered on
criminalizing domestic violence and strengthening the criminal justice
system’s response,1 as exemplified by the proliferation of mandatory arrest
and prosecution policies2 and the escalation of funds dedicated to criminal
justice-oriented programs under the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA).3 Though well-intentioned, the mandatory policies focus on the
state’s interests and fail to take into account a domestic violence survivor’s
wishes and assessment of how the state action will affect her4 safety and
1 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748 (2007)

(describing criminalization efforts as being “in the forefront of domestic violence
reforms”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First
Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 358 (2008) (describing
criminalization as “the focus of U.S. domestic violence advocacy”).
2 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 4
(1999) [hereinafter Epstein, Effective Intervention].
3 A major portion of VAWA funding is devoted to the STOP Violence Against
Women Formula Grant Program, which awards grants to states to develop their criminal
justice responses, with $189 million being allocated to STOP grants in fiscal year 2010.
CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: FY 2010
BRIEFING
BOOK
5,
7
(2009),
available
at
APPROPRIATIONS
http://www.nnedv.org/docs/Policy/fy10briefingbook.pdf. Grants to encourage arrest
policies were allocated an additional $60 million, by far the largest category of funding
after STOP grants under VAWA’s grants to combat violence against women. Id. at 7.
VAWA funding primarily has a criminal justice focus, but has expanded to other victim
services and outreach. See id. at 5; STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/stop_grant_desc.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011).
4 In this Article, I will typically refer to individuals who have experienced abuse as
female and to perpetrators of abuse as male. This is not meant to discount the existence of
domestic violence in same-sex relationships or the reality that men also experience
intimate partner abuse. It is a reflection of the fact that most domestic violence is
experienced by women at the hands of men, and is consistent with the general statistic
that approximately 85% of victims of domestic violence are female. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 1 (2005) (“Females
were 84% of spouse abuse victims and 86% of victims of abuse at the hands of a
boyfriend or girlfriend.”); see also Jean H. Hollenshead et al., Relationship Between Two
Types of Help Seeking Behavior in Domestic Violence Victims, 21 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 271,

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

306

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:2

welfare, thereby denying her autonomy and potentially increasing her
danger.5 The law, however, has the potential both to foster the survivor’s
agency and combat oppression. Between 1976 and 1993, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia enacted civil protection order laws6 with the

271 (2006) (“[T]he most salient risk factor for becoming a victim of violence is to be a
woman”).
5 See infra Part II; see also Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the
Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4
J.L. & POL’Y 463, 505 (1995). Rivera describes mandatory arrest policies as
“philosophically in opposition to feminist and civil rights doctrines which have been
founded on notions of individual and community empowerment and community-based
control.” Id.
6 LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 33
(2008). In most jurisdictions, a petitioner may seek a protection order against a family
member, intimate partner, or roommate, or someone who has sexually assaulted or
stalked her. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010
(2011). To receive a protection order, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent committed domestic violence against the petitioner, as
defined by the state statute. The petitioner may then be awarded safety-related relief such
as an order that prohibits the respondent from assaulting, threatening, stalking, harassing,
coming near, or contacting the petitioner; that awards child custody, visitation, and the
possession of certain property; and that requires the respondent to vacate a shared
residence, complete treatment for domestic violence and drug or alcohol abuse, and pay
attorney’s fees. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.50.060 (2011).
Many improvements have been made to the protection order remedy since its
inception. While early protection order laws protected married women from abusive
husbands, over time, legislatures recognized the range of relationships in which domestic
violence occurs and amended statutes to provide protection for dating relationships,
roommates, and a broader range of family and blood relationships. See Margaret Martin
Berry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 339,
352 n.47 (1995) (explaining that as of the mid-1990s, most protection orders allowed
people to file for a protection order when they were the spouse, cohabitant, or family
member of the alleged abuser, or shared a child with the alleged abuser. In the mid1990s, states began expanding the protected class to include dating relationships, former
spouses, and parties who had sexual or intimate relationships.).
Legislatures also amended the statutes to be gender neutral, which expanded relief to
same-sex couples and permitted men who had been abused by female partners to seek
protection. Shannon Little, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family in SameSex Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 260 (2008) (describing changes
made by a majority of states). In recent years, in light of evidence that one in three
teenagers experiences teen dating violence, legislatures are beginning to expand statutes
to offer protection to abused minors. Christian Molidor & Richard M. Tolman, Gender
and Contextual Factors in Adolescent Dating Violence, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
180, 184 (1998); see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1003 (Supp. 2010) (amending the prior statute
that did not address the ages of the parties to identify petitioners and respondents as being
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universal goals of counteracting abuse, safeguarding domestic violence
victims from further threats or violence, and protecting the survivor’s peace
of mind7 through a remedial remedy that provides “immediate and easily
accessible protection”8 to wide-ranging injunctive relief. Indeed, the civil
protection order remedy has shown promising results for increasing survivor
safety and autonomy.9
The protection order, the most survivor-centered remedy readily
available in courthouses across America, has the ability to shift power and
control back to the person who has experienced violence. To be awarded a
age twelve or older); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010(2) (2011) (addressing teen dating
violence by expanding the age at which a petitioner can seek a protection order).
7 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-26-5-1 (2008) (maintaining that Indiana’s Civil
Protection Order Act “shall be construed to promote the: (1) protection and safety of all
victims of domestic or family violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; and (2)
prevention of future domestic and family violence”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West
2005) (declaring the legislature’s intent to assure domestic violence victims “the
maximum protection from abuse the law can provide. . . . Further, it is the responsibility
of the courts to protect victims of violence that occurs in a family or family-like setting
by providing access to both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies and
sanctions . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-618 (2010) (explaining the Tennessee
Legislature’s intent to provide domestic abuse victims with enhanced legal protection
from violence); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.123.010 (2011) (finding that there is a “present
and growing need to develop innovative strategies and services which will ameliorate and
reduce the trauma of domestic violence”); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(a)–(b) (2010)
(recognizing the ongoing violence victims may experience and the elevated danger at the
point of separation, the legislature desired to create a “speedy remedy to discourage
violence against family or household members with whom the perpetrator of domestic
violence has continuing contact”); Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C. 2005)
(finding that safety concerns trump property rights in light of the law’s broad remedial
purpose).
8 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 (1982); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes
and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1070 (1993) (emphasizing the expedited nature
of the proceedings because “the exigent circumstances of domestic violence require
speedy determinations of whether a protection order will be issued, continued, or
changed”). Legislatures also recognized that domestic violence remedies needed to be
available to lay litigants and, to this end, many jurisdictions developed simplified,
uniform forms for every stage of the process, from filing an initial petition to modifying,
extending, or enforcing the court’s order. See Sean D. Thueson, Civil Domestic Violence
Protection Orders in Wyoming: Do They Protect Victims of Domestic Violence?, 4 WYO.
L. REV. 271, 273 (2004) (explaining how the use of simplified, standardized forms makes
it easier for petitioners to proceed pro se in domestic violence protection order
proceedings); Hon. Hollis L. Webster, Enforcement in Domestic Violence Cases, 26 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 663, 671 (1995) (explaining that the domestic violence law is intended to
make the court system “user friendly” to encourage the entry of protective orders to avoid
further harm).
9 See infra Part II.B.
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civil protection order—the violation of which carries criminal
consequences—domestic violence survivors can file a petition that includes
the allegations they wish to move forward on.10 They can request emergency
safety-related relief to be awarded the day they file, the longer-term relief
they desire, and a full hearing within weeks of filing. While survivors
frequently do not desire a criminal response,11 they do often choose to
engage the civil justice system on their own terms. In fact, the protection
order is now the single most commonly used legal remedy for domestic
violence, with survivors frequently choosing to use only the civil justice
system in their efforts to intervene in and prevent violence.12 There are also
substantial economic benefits to protection orders, with a recent study
conservatively estimating that protection orders save the state of Kentucky
$85 million per year.13 Although the focus on the criminal justice system
10 Many state civil protection order statutes require physical abuse or threats of

violence as grounds for awarding an order. This definition of domestic violence, which
looks for criminal acts, can be distinguished from an advocacy-based understanding of
domestic violence that recognizes the multi-faceted ways that abuse can be perpetrated,
including acts of intimidation, humiliation, or isolation; economic abuse; controlling the
children; controlling another’s immigration status; preventing the survivor from working,
attending school, or sleeping; and harming property and pets; in addition to physical
assaults and threats of physical violence. See Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the
Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1157, 1212–14 (2009) (discussing how current statutory definitions of domestic
violence rely on a criminal definition and oversimplify the problem of domestic violence
by failing to include the many ways in which abusive partners exercise power and control
in relationships).
11 See infra Part II.A, II.B.3.
12 Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The
Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and Technology Solutions, in
HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 147, 149 (Albert R.
Roberts ed., 2002) (finding that survivors are more likely to seek relief from violence
solely in the civil system through protection orders, as compared to using the criminal
justice system); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for
Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (citing civil protection orders as the “most
commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”); EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2005, at 38 (Richard Schauffler et al. eds., 2006) (reporting the protection order
caseloads in twenty-seven states in 2005 and finding that a total of 598,254 protection
orders were sought in the selected states that year); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY
THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii, 52 (2000)
(determining that each year, approximately 17% of the 1.5 million female victims of
domestic violence obtain civil protection orders).
13 TK LOGAN ET AL., THE KENTUCKY CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDER STUDY: A RURAL
AND URBAN MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE STUDY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER VIOLATION
CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND COSTS 8 (2009) (considering a range of costs, including
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predominates, heightened attention to protection orders is warranted for these
multiple reasons.
But we are still near the beginning of formal efforts to respond to
domestic violence, and protection orders are not a panacea for all survivors.
Numerous shortcomings in the laws and processes by which civil protection
orders are awarded reduce the effectiveness of orders,14 and understanding
the actual process that survivors go through in ending intimate partner
violence is critical to improving the remedy they most frequently rely on.
The Stages of Change Model from the field of psychology describes the
process of how domestic violence survivors end relationship violence15 and
is, therefore, a useful tool for examining domestic violence protection order
laws and response systems. The model includes five distinct stages that
emerged from researchers’ interviews with women who were abused by
intimate partners: (1) pre-contemplation; (2) contemplation; (3) preparation;
(4) action; and (5) maintenance.16 Importantly, the model finds that the
evolution through the stages occurs in a cyclical sequence, rather than a
linear fashion, and survivors will typically revisit earlier stages as they move
toward “maintenance.”17 Essentially, ending violence is a process.

costs related to medical care, mental health, legal processes, criminal justice, lost
earnings and property, and time lost for family and civic responsibilities, along with a
quality of life index).
14 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.030 note (2011) (finding in 1992 that
“refinements are needed so that victims have the easy, quick, and effective access to the
court system envisioned at the time the protection order process was first created,” and
finding that domestic violence survivors who have limited English proficiency have
difficulty filing petitions, court forms are inconsistent with the state’s Domestic Violence
Prevention Act, and problems with enforcement of orders abound). See generally infra
Part IV.
15 See Jody Brown, Working Toward Freedom from Violence: The Process of
Change in Battered Women, 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5, 5 (1997); Jessica G. Burke
et al., Defining Appropriate Stages of Change for Intimate Partner Violence Survivors,
24 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 36, 36 (2009) (describing quantitative research and findings
consistent with earlier qualitative studies); Jessica G. Burke et al., Ending Intimate
Partner Violence: An Application of the Transtheoretical Model, 28 AM. J. HEALTH
BEHAVIOR 122, 122–23 (2004) [hereinafter Burke et al., Ending Intimate Partner
Violence]; Jessica G. Burke et al., The Process of Ending Abuse in Intimate
Relationships: A Qualitative Exploration of the Transtheoretical Model, 7 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1144, 1144 (2001) [hereinafter Burke et al., The Process of Ending
Abuse]; Kelly H. Burkitt & Gregory L. Larkin, The Transtheoretical Model in Intimate
Partner Violence Victimization: Stage Changes Over Time, 23 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 411,
412 (2008).
16 Brown, supra note 15, at 9–10.
17 Id. at 9.
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Consistent with feminist theory, domestic violence laws should be
grounded in and responsive to survivors’ actual experiences and needs.18
Roscoe Pound’s call for a sociological jurisprudence,19 in which he brought
together the social sciences and law in arguing that the law should respond to
social needs,20 is a historical antecedent to this approach to law reform. More
recent attempts to make law responsive to human experience can be seen in
behavioral law and economics,21 law and psychology,22 law and society,23
18 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 35–

36, 59–60 (2000) (explaining that because of its roots in the methodology of
consciousness-raising, feminist theory has consistently advocated that the law should be
grounded in women’s experiences); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991) (explaining
that a feminist approach to law reform includes “working from women’s experience[s]”
to “develop legal and cultural strategies that more clearly reveal the struggles we face”).
19 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609–10
(1908) (arguing that the law should strive for practical utility and stating, “[t]he
sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy
of law; for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to
govern . . . ; for putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its
true position as an instrument”); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 146–47 (1912) (“[T]he conception of law as a
means toward social ends, the doctrine that law exists to secure interests, social, public
and private, requires the jurist to keep in touch with life.”); Id. at 489–90 (explaining that
sociological jurists examine the workings of the law, the law’s social purposes, and the
best means of furthering social concepts); see also ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (1954) (describing the law as “a social institution [designed]
to satisfy social wants”); ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 350 (1959) (“Sociological
jurists seek to enable and to compel lawmaking, whether legislative or judicial or
administrative, and also the development, interpretation, and application of legal
precepts, to take more complete and intelligent account of the social facts upon which
law must proceed and to which it is to be applied.”).
20 Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 519
(2006).
21 Behavioral law and economics seeks to respond to people’s actual understanding
of the world and behavior, rather than classic law and economics’ ideal of rationality. See
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2000)
(arguing that law and economics can utilize a more nuanced understanding of human
behavior by drawing on behavioral sciences); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer,
Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 109 (2009) (explaining that behavioralists emphasize the gap
between real human behavior and rationalist assumptions and recognize rationality
failures).
22 See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law
& Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 107–08 (1998) (providing
examples of psycholegal research, including the examination of eyewitness testimony,
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and even constitutional law.24 In this Article, I draw from psychology and
social science studies to improve the law in a way that is consistent with
Pound’s call for a sociological jurisprudence and the recent moves made by
these other disciplines, and that recognizes that law does not exist in a
vacuum and should be responsive to human behavior and the lived reality of
domestic abuse survivors.25
An awareness of the common process of ending domestic violence
described by the Stages of Change Model prompts a critical examination of
the legal system designed to intervene in intimate partner violence. An
exploration of the model’s findings reveals deficiencies in the law’s response
to domestic violence and suggests procedural rule reforms, substantive law
changes, and improvements to legal and advocacy interventions.
Recognizing that some women wish to end the relationship with an abusive
partner, while others wish to maintain the relationship but without the
violence,26 the analysis in this Article is applicable to both decisions and is
aimed at generally making survivors safer.27
Part II of this Article examines the social and legal context that led
policy makers to focus on criminalization at the expense of survivors’
autonomy and concerns about their own safety, and explores the civil
protection order’s potential for increasing survivors’ safety and autonomy.
Part III applies the Stages of Change Model to survivors’ attempts to end
jury decision-making, assessments of dangerousness and competency to stand trial, and
the accuracy of children’s testimony).
23 See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Building the Bridge from Both Sides of the River:
Law and Society and Rational Choice, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 207, 209 (2004)
(discussing how law and society’s realistic approach views humans as responsive to
institutions, norms, the role of power, and historical context).
24 See Robert C. Post, Constitutional Scholarship in the United States, 7 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 416, 422 (2009) (“[C]onstitutional scholarship is primarily driven by the need
to ensure that constitutional law remains responsive to changing political conditions.”).
25 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731,
758 (2008) (noting that multiple scholars and legal movements have recognized how the
law should be “attentive to the purposes and needs of society”).
26 Supporting a woman’s decision to stay in an intimate relationship, but under
different terms, is autonomy-enhancing. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 1489
(critiquing current laws and advocacy practices that require women to separate from their
partners).
27 See Susan Schechter, Expanding Solutions for Domestic Violence and Poverty:
What Battered Women with Abused Children Need From Their Advocates, 13 BUILDING
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, 7–8
(2000),
http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/BCS13_ES.pdf (“Advocates have always
said that women have the right to be in safe and respectful relationships. The domestic
violence movement’s historic goal has been to end violence and coercion, not to have
women leave their relationships.”).
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violence in their lives and details the five stages of this model. Part IV
considers how an understanding of the stages in the model would change the
construct of civil protection order laws and processes. Part IV first focuses on
the legal implications of the principle that ending violence is a process. The
societal expectation that leaving is the easy answer to violence masks the
multiple oppressions women who are abused face and the complexities of
external and internal barriers to leaving. With survivors progressing through
the stages in a spiral and returning to court to seek help over time, many
petitioners will need to access the protection order remedy several times,
which counsels toward removing procedural barriers, as recommended in
Part IV. This Article offers economic and safety justifications for advocacy
support across the stages in response to the current system’s failure to
address survivors’ safety planning needs in the preparation stage and the
emotional and tangible resources they need to sustain an end to violence in
the maintenance stage. Part IV also contains policy prescriptions and
recommendations for substantive law changes. These include greater judicial
accountability so that judicial treatment of domestic violence cases in the
action stage is aligned with the legislative intent of this remedy, expanded
forms of statutory relief necessary to maintain freedom from violence, and
meaningful enforcement of protection orders in the maintenance stage.

II. THE PROMISE OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
A. The Social and Judicial Focus on Criminalization at the Expense of
Survivor Autonomy
After a history of the government condoning violence against women,28
the anti-domestic violence and second wave feminist movement of the 1970s
and 1980s organized to bring to light the prevalence and harms of domestic
abuse and to develop legal and social remedies to intimate partner violence,
including the civil protection order remedy and shelters for battered

28 See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST

WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 2–4, 60 (1979) (explaining how American and
European laws did little to protect women from abuse until the 1970s. In medieval
Europe, for example, a husband only faced criminal penalties for killing or maiming his
wife, while all other violence he perpetrated against her was permissible.); Reva B.
Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2122–41 (1996) (describing the history of domestic violence laws in the United
States, the absence of criminal and civil laws until the 1970s, and the race and class bias
in selectively prosecuting domestic violence once laws were enacted).
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women.29 In reaction to the historic absence of adequate police response to
victims’ calls for help30 and prosecutors’ abject failure to charge domestic
violence crimes,31 the movement insisted that violence in the home should be
treated as seriously as stranger violence.32 Feminists had viewed the criminal
justice system as the “embodiment of institutionalized male power over
women,” with the battered women’s movement challenging state power and
patriarchy while giving voice to and aiding survivors.33 A tenuous
realignment then grew with the hope that domestic violence would become a

29 See Richard J. Gelles, Public Policy for Intimate Violence and Child

Maltreatment: A Few Successes, Many False Promises, 69 UMKC L. REV. 25, 27–
28 (2000).
30 Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining how police
typically delayed responding to a domestic violence call until the violence had ended or
informally mediated the situation); Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response to
Domestic Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127,
133 (1999) [hereinafter Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response] (reporting that in 1990
in the District of Columbia, police arrested accused batterers in only 5% of all domestic
violence cases and failed to make arrests in over 85% of cases in which the police
observed that the victim had sustained serious injuries).
31 Douglas L. Yearwood, Judicial Dispositions of Ex-Parte and Domestic Violence
Protection Order Hearings: A Comparative Analysis of Victim Requests and Court
Authorized Relief, 20 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 161, 162 (2005) (studies of the failure to
prosecute domestic violence crimes show rates ranging from 60–80%).
32 Gelles, supra note 29, at 27. Legislatures eventually determined to combat
domestic violence by enacting both civil and criminal remedies. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005) (insisting that “violent behavior [in domestic relationships]
will not be excused or tolerated, and . . . the existing criminal laws and civil remedies
created under this act will be enforced without regard to the fact that the violence grows
out of a domestic situation”); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(a)–(b) (2010) (resolving that
“[d]omestic violence can be deterred, prevented or reduced by legal intervention that
treats this problem with the seriousness that it deserves”); Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597
A.2d 927, 931 (D.C. 1991) (finding that while the protection order law is not explicitly a
civil rights statute, it was designed to combat the exploitation and abuse of women and
their children).
The anti-domestic violence movement has a recent history. See generally Gelles,
supra note 29, at 27–28 (explaining that the first shelter for battered women was created
in the 1960s. Soon after, grassroots advocates engaged in political and policy reform and
created statewide coalitions against domestic violence. States enacted order of protection
laws and mandatory arrest legislation. Eventually, the federal government established an
Office of Violence Against Women, enacted federal remedies, and awarded states block
grants.).
33 See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1676 (2004).
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public issue and the state’s authority would now combat intimate partner
violence.34
Even after instituting laws to criminalize domestic violence, police and
prosecutorial conduct remained largely unchanged, so legislatures eventually
instituted mandatory policies to ensure vigorous responses to domestic
violence.35 The historical absence of governmental response yielded to an
aggressive response from the criminal justice system; mandatory arrest
policies now require police to make an arrest when there is probable cause to
believe domestic violence occurred.36 Additionally, no-drop or mandatory
prosecution policies have prosecutors view domestic violence as a crime
against the state and vindicate the government’s interests by proceeding with
a criminal case regardless of the survivor’s wishes.37 While immediate police
response is essential to intervene in violence and a serious approach by
prosecutors was long overdue, both mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies are troubling because they fail to take into account a survivor’s
desires and assessment of how the state action will affect her safety and
welfare.38
Domestic violence is understood as the abusive partner’s systematic
exercise of power and control over his partner,39 and research shows that the
survivor’s ability to increase her autonomy is essential to her increased
safety.40 In many instances, however, the state replicates the abuser’s control
34 See id. (identifying tension due to questions of whether the battered women’s

movement could partner with the state without being “coopted by it,” and whether the
state would misappropriate the domestic violence issue and ultimately cause harm to
abuse survivors); see also Gruber, supra note 1, at 758 (“[F]eminists realized the risks of
using state power to make the lives of women better. . . . State institutional mechanisms
had historically subverted efforts toward women’s empowerment. In addition, the
criminal justice system itself was infested with racial, socioeconomic, and gender biases
that manifested every time criminal enforcement was increased.”).
35 Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 4.
36 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT.
§ 968.075(2) (2010), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/Stat0968.pdf.
37 Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response, supra note 30, at 134–35.
38 See LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO
INTIMATE ABUSE 40 (2003) (discussing ways the criminal justice system should adapt to
meet victims’ needs, including adopting a “mandatory action” policy whereby police
would allow victims to choose an action such as deciding whether an arrest should be
made, being transported to a shelter, or having the offender transported to a detoxification
center).
39 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 12, at iv (explaining that empirical data proves
that the domestic violence perpetrated by an abusive partner is “often a part of a
systematic pattern of dominance and control”).
40 Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1126 (2009).
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by silencing a survivor’s ability to self-determine and mandating her
participation in the state-centric criminal justice system. A survivor’s
agency41 or autonomy42 is in tension with the intersecting competing
coercive forces of state mechanisms of control43 and actions of an abusive
partner who intimidates or forces a woman not to pursue criminal action. The
mandatory state policies result in greater paternalism and state coercion of
abuse survivors, particularly those who are marginalized by race, class, or
immigrant status.44 Furthermore, the policies are in philosophical opposition
to feminist principles of agency, self-determination, empowerment, social
justice for women, and resistance of patriarchal structures.45 It is not
uncommon for prosecutors to compel a survivor’s appearance at trial through
the use of subpoena power and to ask the court to find her in contempt if she
fails to obey the summons.46 Some prosecutors even threaten victims that if
41 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 96 (2d ed.
2003) (“[A]gency means the capacity to direct one’s own life through individual action
and choice.” (emphasis omitted)); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 346 (1995) (identifying a
feminist model of “partial agency,” which juxtaposes women’s “capacity for selfdirection and resistance” with “often-internalized patriarchal constraint”); Rachel A. Van
Cleave, Rape and the Querela in Italy: False Protection of Victim Agency, 13 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 273, 298–300 (2007) (in defining agency, noting the importance of
accounting for the impact of social norms and the barriers that impede choices).
42 See generally Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 826–27 (1999) (exploring
the concepts of agency, self-definition, and self-direction and describing the complexity
of relational interdependence, social influence on self-definition, and the role of political
context); Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 821 (2001) (“The concept of agency
rests on the realization that autonomy for subordinated persons is always partial,
contingent, and emerging.”) [hereinafter Coker, Crime Control].
43 Coker, Crime Control, supra note 42, at 807 (“The dilemma for feminists is to
develop strategies for controlling state actors—ensuring that the police come when called
and that prosecutors do not trivialize cases—without increasing state control of women.”
(emphasis omitted)).
44 Id. at 821–23 (describing sources of restraint that operate in battered women’s
lives and noting the danger that “feminist law reformers will both overestimate the state’s
power to do good and underestimate the power of the state to do harm”).
45 Rivera, supra note 5, at 505; see Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response, supra
note 30, at 128 (encouraging activists to “identify strategies to reduce the movement’s
profound dependence on state action” and to find ways to “strengthen the victim’s role in
the context of an exercise of state power”).
46 Sack, supra note 33, at 1681. This practice continues to be the norm across
jurisdictions. There are, however, some rare and noteworthy exceptions. I was impressed
when, in a recent case in Seattle, the prosecutor contacted the student attorneys in the
Domestic Violence Clinic I teach to say that she was trying to reach the client to
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they do not comply, the prosecutors “will refer their case to child protection”
and the victims “will be in danger of losing their children.”47 One prosecutor
recently remarked to me, “We take away women’s autonomy.” Autonomy is
not merely an important theoretical concept;48 it has implications for a
survivor’s safety that are dangerous to disregard.49
An abuse survivor may not desire criminal justice involvement for a
multitude of reasons, including her awareness that the arrest or prosecution
of her abuser could place her in greater danger due to his escalated violence
or retaliation. This is especially true in light of the short one- to three-day jail
sentences that abusive partners typically face for domestic violence crimes.50
She may also be concerned about the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions on her partner and family.51 If she has had prior negative
experiences with the criminal justice system,52 or if law enforcement has not
determine whether the client had any safety-related concerns about the prosecution
moving forward.
47 Id. at 1682.
48 See supra notes 41–42.
49 Studies show that the complaining witness’s input in criminal legal sanctions
increases her safety. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of
Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT
127, 142, 156–57 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (finding that giving women the choice of
whether to drop criminal charges against the abuser gives the women bargaining power
that enhances their safety); see also David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, The Voices of
Domestic Violence Victims: Predictors of Victim Preference for Arrest and the
Relationship Between Preference for Arrest and Revictimization, 49 CRIME & DELINQ.
313, 313 (2003) (finding a significant association between a victim’s desire for arrest and
subsequent abuse and recommending that police take the victim’s requests into account).
50 See Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When “Enough Is Enough”: Battered Women’s
Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 419
(1995) (reporting one survey respondent’s experience: “He was taken to jail. I went to the
hospital, had the x-rays and he was home before I was. . . . It made me feel, as far as he
was concerned, that the [previous order] was not protecting me. Because every time I
called, I mean they turned around and let him right back out. . . . And what the cops put
me through, it made me feel like, unless I was seriously almost dead, I wouldn’t call them
again.”).
51 Criminal convictions affect employment, immigration, voting, public benefits,
and many other aspects of an individual’s life. See Michael Pinard, An Integrated
Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues
Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 623–33 (2006)
(describing increased attention to the indirect consequences of federal and state
convictions); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)–(ii) (2006) (classes of “deportable
aliens” include individuals convicted of domestic violence, stalking, or violating a
protection order).
52 When individuals receive hostile, unhelpful responses from police, judges, or
lawyers, they are less likely to turn to these systems, whereas victims return to
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been a source of safety in her community, she may be reluctant to turn to a
historically discriminatory state institution because these mandatory policies
disproportionately impact communities of color.53 She may additionally be
aware of the reality of her increased likelihood of arrest because mandatory
policies increase dual arrests.54 State intervention through arrest or
prosecution, furthermore, does not guarantee future safety, as demonstrated
by studies showing that mandatory criminal responses have equivocal
outcomes for victim safety55 and result in increased violence for some
populations.56

institutions that offer positive, affirming interactions. See, e.g., Fischer & Rose, supra
note 50, at 426 (“[O]ne woman described how a supportive police officer had given her a
piece of paper with information about orders of protection months before she decided to
seek one. She held onto this paper, underlining relevant sections, and came to view it as
reassuring while she struggled to decide how to end the abuse in her life.”).
53 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991);
Rivera, supra note 5, at 504–06.
54 Mutual arrests are particularly likely when the abuser claims there was mutual
violence or when officers are unwilling to determine who initiated the violence. See L.
Kevin Hamberger & Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested for
Domestic Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 125,
126 (1994) (reporting that after Wisconsin instituted mandatory arrest laws, arrests of
women increased twelve-fold, while arrests of men increased only two-fold); Kit
Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s
Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 159–60 & n.27 (2004) (describing the
shortcomings of mandatory arrest policies and how such laws have had the effect of
increasing the number of abuse victims who are arrested).
In my experience litigating cases and directing domestic violence clinics, I have seen
multiple examples of mandatory policies taken to extremes that are contrary to victim
safety. One client who had testified for the prosecution after being beaten and strangled
was then prosecuted for holding onto her ex-boyfriend’s shirt. Another client was
prosecuted for spitting on her husband, a man who had committed extreme physical and
sexual abuse against her and had killed the family’s dog in front of the children. In both
households, the aggressor and abuser was readily apparent. Had the prosecution
examined the context of these women’s acts and the history of violence in the
relationships, rather than mechanically following a mandatory edict, these women would
not have been defendants.
55 See Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic
Violence?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 43, 46 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (concluding that arrest has, at best, a modest and short-lived
deterrence effect).
56 See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity:
Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 680, 686
(1992) (finding that unemployed and unmarried men who are arrested have increased
rates of reoffense, while men who are employed and married reoffend at lower rates).
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B. The Case for Civil Protection Orders
While extensive funds and efforts have been directed at enhancing the
criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence, this Article calls for
a rededication to the civil justice response of the civil protection order for
three reasons: (1) its pervasive utilization by survivors; (2) its proven
effectiveness relative to other interventions; and (3) its autonomy-promoting
character that correlates with enhanced safety.

1. Civil Protection Orders Are the Legal Remedy Survivors Most
Commonly Elect
Civil protection orders are now the single most frequently used legal
remedy to address intimate partner violence.57 All states have, at a minimum,
preliminary laws and structures in place that can be expanded upon. Further
improvement of this tool is warranted because it is so widely used, and
survivors profoundly rely on this court order to intervene in and prevent
violence.

2. Protection Orders Typically Increase Survivors’ Safety
Protection orders are key to intervening in domestic violence, with
studies showing that “[p]rotection orders, when properly drafted and
enforced, are effective in eliminating or reducing domestic abuse.”58
Researchers have found that when abused women seek help from the civil
justice system by filing for a protection order, they experience “significantly
57 See supra note 12.
58 Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 811–13; see also Victoria Holt et al., Do

Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury?, 24 AM.
J. PREVENTIVE MED. 16, 16–21 (2003) (concluding that domestic abuse survivors who
obtain civil orders for protection experience a decreased likelihood of subsequent
physical and non-physical domestic violence, including significantly decreased risk of
weapon threats, injuries, abuse-related medical treatment, and contact by the abusive
partner); Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An
18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613,
613–18 (2004) (finding that women who sought and qualified for protection orders had
significant reductions in physical assaults, threats of bodily harm, stalking, and worksite
harassment, regardless of whether the orders were granted). But cf. Jane C. Murphy,
Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect
Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 510–14 (2003) (recognizing
that battered women use multiple legal and non-legal strategies to prevent violence,
obtaining only a short-term emergency protection order achieves some women’s goals,
and the lack of representation and the significant institutional barriers that persist make it
difficult for many petitioners to complete the protection order process).
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lower levels” of violence—including threats, physical abuse, stalking,
employment-related harassment, and other risk factors for femicide—
regardless of the outcome of the case.59 One study that measured the efficacy
of protection orders over an eighteen-month period found that when a woman
applied and qualified for a protection order, she experienced a “rapid and
significant decline in violence,” which was sustained through the duration of
the study.60 Another survey of protection order petitioners found that when
women applied for orders, 98% felt more in control of their lives,61 89% felt
more in control of the relationship,62 and women generally reported that the
act of applying for the order improved their sense of well-being.63 In followup interviews, 80% of participants felt safer, 85% reported that their lives
had improved, and over 90% felt better about themselves.64
When judges enter orders with comprehensive relief, there is an
increased likelihood that the order will reduce the abuse and increase the
petitioner’s autonomy.65 One study found that when domestic violence
survivors are awarded civil protection orders, they have an 80% decrease in
subsequent police-reported physical intimate partner violence.66 Other
studies, which also conclude that protection orders are effective at decreasing
violence, emphasize that the level of efficacy depends on the severity of the
past violence, the level of resistance the respondent exhibits during the
hearing, the specificity of the relief the court orders, whether the relief is
comprehensive, the abuser’s prior criminal record, and whether police and
courts enforce orders.67 Thus, receiving the court’s protection as needed over
time is another key element to sustained freedom from terror and bodily
harm.

59 McFarlane et al., supra note 58, at 616–17.
60 Id. at 617.
61 Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 417.
62 Id.
63 Civil Protection Orders: Victims’ Views on Effectiveness, NAT’L INST. JUST. RES.
PREVIEW (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1998, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Civil
Protection Orders].
64 Id.
65 Edward W. Gondolf et al., Court Response to Petitions for Civil Protection
Orders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 503, 513 (1994).
66 Holt et al., supra note 58, at 20.
67 See Civil Protection Orders, supra note 63, at 1 (summarizing factors that
increase efficacy and that lead petitioners to feel that the orders are effective); see also
Leonore Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Processing of
Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 43, 76–78 (1995) (heralding
protection orders as a valuable way to obtain relief from violence that permits an abused
woman to take lasting measures to gain independence).
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3. Protection Orders Enhance Survivors’ Autonomy
Protection orders are a critical point of intervention for many individuals
who experience abuse because they allow survivors to advance their
autonomy along with their safety. A survivor’s capacity to exercise
autonomy is associated with her ability to overcome the abusive partner’s
control.68 When women are able to self-direct, self-define, exercise agency,
and exert autonomy—as the civil protection order process should encourage
them to do—they can shift the power in the relationship, reconstruct or exit
relationships, and decrease violence in their lives.69
Although many people conflate civil protection orders and criminal
restraining orders, there are essential distinctions that make protection orders
a more attractive option for many individuals. First, a civil protection order
case is a survivor’s own case, not the government’s. The survivor defines the
nature of the problem and chooses when to bring the case, which events to
allege, and what relief to pursue in an attempt to meet her particular safety
needs.70 In most states, orders may commonly include relief that prohibits the
respondent from abusing, threatening, harassing, and assaulting the petitioner
and her children and from destroying their property; prevents the respondent
from contacting or coming near the petitioner, children, and certain locations;
requires the respondent to enter domestic violence, parenting, drug, and/or
alcohol counseling; awards temporary custody, visitation, and property;
orders the respondent to vacate a shared residence; and requires the
respondent to pay attorney’s fees.71 In addition to statutorily enumerated
relief, states commonly permit civil courts to award other relief necessary to
resolve and prevent violence.72 The wide-ranging injunctive relief available
68 Johnson, supra note 40, at 1126.
69 Id. at 1114.
70 TK Logan et al., Protective Orders: Questions and Conundrums, 7 TRAUMA,

VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 175, 180 (2006) [hereinafter Logan et al., Questions and
Conundrums] (praising the flexibility of protection orders, which allow survivors to gain
what they need from the justice system, and concluding that the orders are consistent with
the Rawlsian distributive justice model because they allow for individual differences in
the experience of liberty, but guarantee fundamental protections).
71 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (Supp. 2010). New remedies continue to be
developed; for example, recognizing a correlation between domestic violence and animal
abuse, legislatures are beginning to statutorily provide protection to household pets and
farm animals. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(l) (2011) (permitting the court
to award custody or control of pets and to require the respondent to stay away from areas
where the pets may be found).
72 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(11) (Supp. 2010) (permitting courts to order
the respondent to “perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the
effective resolution of the matter”).
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in civil protection orders is far more comprehensive than relief offered
through criminal restraining orders, which solely order the respondent not to
come near, contact, assault, or threaten the victim. The civil orders are also
available more immediately through the ex parte emergency order and the
longer-term order that is entered within weeks. In civil litigation, the
petitioner can request to dismiss the case if she determines that the civil
protection order is not helpful to her, whether because it does not meet her
needs or because she anticipates that increased danger would result. Her right
to exercise autonomy takes precedent over any general public interest.
The civil remedy can be contrasted with the prosecutor’s office deciding
whether to bring charges and what to charge; subpoenaing a victim to testify,
even unwillingly; and conducting plea bargains and recommending the terms
of the court order, most often without seeking the abuse survivor’s input. In
promoting the dual goals of advancing safety and autonomy, protection
orders can include relief to end the violence without insisting that the woman
end the relationship, as criminal “no contact” orders do when judges enter
such orders without consulting the victim. There are a multitude of reasons
why a survivor may desire court protection but not wish to pursue criminal
sanctions,73 and protection orders offer the survivor a tailored order that
holds the respondent legally accountable with the threat of criminal sanctions
for its violation.74
While there are many indications of the success of protection orders,
abuse survivors still confront numerous challenges when attempting to use
this legal remedy. Because the protection order is the remedy most utilized
and available to victims, and in light of its potential effectiveness, it is
important that this remedy be available to survivors who need to seek help
from the court over time and that courts respond to individual survivors’
needs. Under the most developed protection order laws and practices,
protection orders can achieve safety for abuse survivors and their children,
prevent violence, hold abusers accountable, challenge batterers’ sense of
entitlement to dominate their partners, restore women’s lost resources and

73 See supra Part II.A.
74 If the respondent violates the protection order, criminal charges may arise from

the violation, particularly when the petitioner reports the respondent’s violation of an
anti-violence or no-contact provision to the police. The petitioner can also bring an action
to adjudicate civil or criminal contempt to enforce her order. See generally Michelle R.
Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence
Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 53 (2000) (explaining protection orders as the
“intersection of traditional community-based and justice system approaches: victim
empowerment coupled with deterrence. A [civil protection order] combines a victiminitiated intervention with the power of enforcement by the criminal justice system.”).
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opportunities, and enhance women’s agency and control over their lives.75
This “ideal” intervention strategy, however, has suffered from “inadequate”76
and “resistant implementation,”77 as will be explored in Part IV. An
evaluation of the Stages of Change Model reveals how protection order laws
and processes can improve to encourage survivors to progress through the
stages toward maintaining an end to violence, and what additional relief and
institutional support is necessary for freedom from violence.

III. THE STAGES OF CHANGE MODEL
The Stages of Change Model is an important tool for understanding the
dynamics of domestic violence and for evaluating violence prevention
solutions. While other models explore the range of behaviors an abusive
partner employs to gain and maintain power and control in a relationship,78
the Stages of Change Model describes the process of how domestic violence
survivors end relationship violence over time.79
The Stages of Change Model, which is also referred to as the
Transtheoretical Model of Behavior Change,80 grew out of empirical

75 Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.

207, 207–09 (1997) (asserting that any domestic violence intervention should be
evaluated against these six main goals).
76 Gondolf et al., supra note 65, at 504.
77 Id.
78 The Duluth Power and Control Wheel is the predominant model used to describe
intimate partner violence. See Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE
INTERVENTION PROJECT, http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PhyVio.pdf (last visited
July 6, 2010) (identifying the range of behaviors a batterer may use to exert and maintain
power and control over an intimate partner, including physical, sexual, emotional, and
economic abuse; using the children; making threats; intimidating or isolating the victim;
exerting male privilege; and minimizing or denying the violence or blaming the
survivor).
79 Brown, supra note 15, at 5.
80 See, e.g., James O. Prochaska & Wayne F. Velicer, The Transtheoretical Model
of Health Behavior Change, 12 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 38, 38 (1997). Although the
Stages of Change Model and Transtheoretical Model of Behavior Change are names that
are often used interchangeably in psychology, psychotherapy, and public health literature,
the Stages of Change Model is one component of the Transtheoretical Model of Behavior
Change, which uses multiple constructs of change. See Eileen A. McConnaughy et al.,
Stages of Change in Psychotherapy: Measurement and Sample Profiles, 20
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 368, 368 (1983) (explaining that in this
integrative model of change, the stages of change are a fundamental part of a
transtheoretical therapy model, and the five stages of change interact with ten basic
processes of change).
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investigations by James Prochaska and Carlo DiClemente81 and is based on
psychotherapy and behavior change theories that examine how people make
changes in their lives, whether on their own or with assistance.82 The model
conceptualizes behavior change as a process that occurs in five stages: (1)
pre-contemplation, where the individual is not intending to change; (2)
contemplation, where the person thinks about change; (3) preparation, an
active planning stage; (4) action, where someone explicitly makes changes;
and (5) maintenance, where the change is solidified.83 This model is widely
accepted in the field of psychology, and extensive qualitative and
quantitative research shows the applicability of this model to the specific
context of ending relationship violence.84 Researchers discovered the validity
of this application by conducting in-depth interviews of women who had
recently experienced domestic violence or who were currently in abusive
relationships and asking the women to “walk through your relationship,
starting at the point when you realized that your partner’s behavior was a
problem.”85 The women described five stages of change, consistent with the
81 James O. Prochaska & Carlo C. DiClemente, Transtheoretical Therapy: Toward a
More Integrative Model of Change, 19 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH &
PRACTICE 276, 282 (1982) (citing their early studies which examined smoking cessation
behaviors and reported that subjects identified four stages and differentiated between the
following stages of change: (1) thinking about quitting; (2) becoming determined to stop
smoking; (3) actively modifying habits and/or the environment; and (4) maintaining the
new habit of not smoking).
82 This model has successfully been applied to describe the process of creating
change regarding a variety of behaviors, including smoking cessation, weight loss or
control, arthritis self-management, drug addiction, alcohol abuse, sun and radon
exposure, safer sex, and the process of ending relationship violence. See, e.g., Mark A.
Belding et al., Stages and Processes of Change Among Polydrug Users in Methadone
Maintenance Treatment, 39 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPEND. 45 (1995); Burke et al., Ending
Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 15, at 123; Diane M. Grimley et al., Assessing the
Stages of Change and Decision-Making for Contraceptive Use for the Prevention of
Pregnancy, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome,
20 HEALTH EDUC. BEHAV. 455 (1993); Francis J. Keefe et al., Understanding the
Adoption of Arthritis Self-Management: Stages of Change Profiles Among Arthritis
Patients, 87 PAIN 303 (2000); Catherine A. Perz et al., Doing the Right Thing at the Right
Time? The Interaction of Stages and Processes of Change in Successful Smoking
Cessation, 15 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 462 (1996); James O. Prochaska et al., Stages of
Change and Decisional Balance for 12 Problem Behaviors, 13 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 39
(1994); Susan R. Rossi et al., A Processes of Change Model for Weight Control for
Participants in Community-Based Weight Loss Programs, 29 INT’L J. ADDICT. 161
(1994).
83 Burke et al., Ending Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 15, at 123.
84 See supra note 15.
85 Burke et al., Ending Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 15, at 124–25
(describing a study of seventy-eight domestic abuse survivors and the researchers’ use of
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Stages of Change Model.86 Whereas the Stages of Change Model has often
been applied to individual behavioral change that is under one person’s
control, such as smoking cessation, the model is flexible enough to apply to
intimate partner abuse, which necessarily implicates a relationship. In the
context of domestic violence, the change an individual makes is relational,87
and an understanding of the model must take into account the influence of
the partner and his reaction to this relationship change.
The Stages of Change Model assumes that progression through the stages
is a dynamic process and posits that progress through the stages occurs in a
cyclical, rather than linear, sequence.88 It is expected that a survivor will
revisit earlier stages as she moves toward maintenance.89 For example, a
survivor may move from pre-contemplation to contemplation to preparation,
and then revisit the contemplation and preparation stages before progressing
to action. Her work in each stage is of acute importance, and her stage of
change or “readiness to change” reflects “motivation, efficacy, denial, and
openness to seeking help.”90 People come closer to terminating violence as
they progress through stages, learn more about themselves and options for
freedom from the abusive relationship, and employ helping resources.
Essentially, ending violence is a process that occurs in stages, and the change
is frequently iterative.91

open-ended questions to prompt women to describe their experiences of abuse in their
own words).
86 Id. at 123; Burke et al., The Process of Ending Abuse, supra note 15, at 1144
(finding the model to be “consistent with how women describe surviving their abusive
situations” in that the women talked about five stages of change that are defined in
relationship to intimate partner violence).
87 Brown, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that change occurs within the context of a
relationship and to the relationship).
88 Id. at 9–10.
89 Brown, supra note 15, at 10 (“As people recycle through the stages, they
potentially learn from the mistakes and keep getting higher and closer to termination, at
which point the problem is no longer an issue. In this model, relapse is seen as a natural
and expected part of progressing.”); McConnaughy et al., supra note 80, at 369
(cautioning that the stages cannot be assumed to be discrete and that movement is not
necessarily unidirectional).
90 Katreena L. Scott & David A. Wolfe, Readiness to Change as a Predictor of
Outcome in Batterer Treatment, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 879, 880
(2003).
91 Burke et al., Ending Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 15, at 123 (explaining
how domestic violence victims may relapse between stages in the process toward
maintenance).
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Contrary to early theories on learned helplessness,92 research now shows
that women who experience abuse are typically active survivors who are
highly motivated to terminate the violence and are vigorously engaged in
help-seeking efforts and the process of surviving violence.93 Abuse survivors
engage in many strategic responses and behaviors to protect their children
and themselves. The Stages of Change Model reveals how women think
about the violence in their lives, what survivors do as they attempt to end
domestic violence, and the stages they go through in their active survival as
they progress toward maintenance.
This model recognizes variances in experiences of abuse and applies to
infinite forms of domestic violence. The model is not confined to legal
definitions of criminal offenses, which often limit the ability to utilize the
civil or criminal justice systems to only those who have experienced
recognizable physical assaults.94 With the basic premise that leaving or
ending violence within a relationship is a process, effectuating change in a
violent relationship is not the same from person to person. Survivors will
have had varied lived experiences of violence, be at different stages of
change, and progress through the stages in their own ways. It is important not
to lose sight of the complexities of individual relationships and the multiple
oppressions that abuse survivors face95 so that the model serves as a tool for
broadening one’s understanding of domestic violence while avoiding
reducing or essentializing experiences.
The next five sections detail the five stages of the Stages of Change
Model and apply the stages to survivors’ efforts to end domestic violence.
Later, in Part IV, this Article asks judicial systems to adapt to the reality that
92 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 33, 86–94 (Springer
Series: Focus on Women Ser. No. 6, 1984) (applying to battered women the conclusions
of an experiment in which dogs received electric shocks in an inescapable environment.
The dogs eventually ceased trying to escape and became passive. Walker argued that
women similarly develop “learned helplessness” and stay in abusive relationships,
convinced that they are unable to escape.).
93 EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11–18, 20–24, 93 (1988)
(studying over 6,000 women in fifty battered women’s shelters and concluding that they
“are in fact ‘survivors,’ in that they assertively and persistently attempt to do something
about their abuse. They contact a variety of help sources where one would expect to find
assistance. The help sources, however, do not appear to muster the decisive intervention
necessary to stop the cycle of violence.”).
94 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001(6)–(9) (Supp. 2010).
95 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2000)
[hereinafter Coker, Shifting Power] (noting the importance of differences, such as
immigration status, migration experiences, language, and culture, in understanding the
experiences of abused women).
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many women go through in their lengthy process to free themselves from
domestic violence.

A. Pre-Contemplation
In the pre-contemplation stage, the person experiencing intimate partner
violence may not be aware of the problem or the extent and consequences of
the problem.96 She may minimize the problem, classifying it as an aberrant
event to avoid thinking about her situation or diminishing the severity of
what she experienced by comparing herself to those who have experienced
more extreme violence, and may respond defensively to pressure to leave the
relationship.97 If physical violence has occurred, she may blame herself, have
an alternative explanation for the occurrence, and rationalize the remnants of
injuries that others observe.98 An abuse survivor in the pre-contemplation
stage likely does not perceive a need for change, have a desire to receive
services, or intend to make changes.99 Women who do not think there is
anything they can do to change the problem will have difficulty envisioning
options for change.100
If an abuse survivor is interacting with service providers at this stage, she
may be pressured to do so by family members, friends, or her employer, or
she may be required to do so by court order.101 Because of her denial and
minimization, the interaction does not reflect a personal choice or internal
decision. For example, a woman may seek a protection order in response to
the demands of a child protective services worker who offers this as an
alterative to charging her with neglect for “failing to protect” her child from
the abusive environment.102 If the respondent has been disruptive at the
petitioner’s workplace or if the employer fears for the safety of other
employees, an abuse survivor may reluctantly seek a protection order to
prevent the respondent from coming to the workplace at the employer’s
insistence. A survivor may also be an unwilling complaining witness in a
criminal case, for example, when a third party has called the police or when
96 McConnaughy et al., supra note 80, at 369 (explaining that someone in this stage
is not aware of the problem or is ignoring the problem).
97 Brown, supra note 15, at 11 (explaining the many reasons why people are in the
pre-contemplation stage).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 John V. Petrocelli, Processes and Stages of Change: Counseling with the
Transtheoretical Model of Change, 80 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 22, 24 (2002) (offering
ways in which someone in the pre-contemplation stage may come into contact with
system actors, such as courts or counselors).
102 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(i) (Supp. 2010).
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the survivor calls the police for immediate intervention, but believes that
arrest and prosecution will increase her danger. For women experiencing
domestic violence who are thrust into the legal system against their wishes,
the system’s actions may not have a positive impact on safety or a sense of
autonomy.
An abuse survivor in the pre-contemplation stage accepts the abusive
partner’s definition of the situation in which he convinces her that it is her
fault that he became violent and minimizes his violence. As such, she may
try to alter her behavior to accommodate her partner to avoid “causing” the
violence again.103 The abusive partner may simultaneously shirk
responsibility for the violence and shower her with gifts and promises of
reform, providing her with optimism that the abuse will not recur.104 To
move from pre-contemplation to contemplation, an abuse survivor will need
to come to her own definition of the situation, recognize the violence as
wrong, and realize she is not responsible for her partner’s violence.105 Her
definition of intimate partner violence is not static and will shift as the level
of violence and the abuser’s contrition shifts.106 Her definition will also be
informed by interpersonal and sociocultural factors in which her life
experiences are embedded, such as her individual and relational history;
economic, political, religious, and cultural context;107 and intersecting
dimensions of race, class, gender, and culture.108 The definitional question is
central to the issue of change because a woman’s readiness to make changes
and to employ particular strategies will influence how she defines her
situation, and her characterization of the intimate partner violence will
likewise influence the strategies she chooses for combating the violence.109
In addition, many women who experience domestic violence have
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or suicidal ideation as a result of

103 Sondra Burman, Cognitive Problem-Solving Therapy and Stages of Change That

Facilitate and Sustain Battered Women’s Leaving, in BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 33, 40 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 3d ed. 2007) (explaining how an abused partner
is unable to view the abuser in a realistic light during this stage).
104 Id.
105 Brown, supra note 15, at 11, 22 (describing the primacy of the abuser’s
definition of the violence, but noting that abused women will have insights that challenge
the partner’s definition).
106 Belle Liang et al., A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Help-Seeking
Processes Among Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence, 36 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 71, 75 (2005).
107 Id. at 74.
108 Id. at 75 (“Women’s interpretations of male domination and violence are shaped
by gender, culture, and social location in the hierarchies of class and race.”).
109 Id. at 74–75.
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the trauma.110 As physical assaults, injuries, sexual abuse, or psychological
violence becomes increasingly severe, a woman is likely to experience
progressively serious psychological effects.111 Her help-seeking ability may
be hindered by avoidance responses such as “psychic numbing,” in which
she denies or minimizes any awareness of the trauma.112 In addition to other
safety resources, survivors may need treatment to manage their symptoms
and recover because the consequential responses can be debilitating.

B. Contemplation
In the contemplation stage, someone experiencing domestic violence
begins to be aware that a problem exists and to name the violence.113 The
survivor struggles to understand the problem, including its cause and
potential solutions, but may resist self-identifying as “abused” or defining the
situation as domestic violence based on social constructs.114 She will search
out social, economic, and emotional support from others as she gathers
information, receives feedback, and problem-solves to figure out a way to
end the violence.115 In this stage, she considers the advantages and
disadvantages of taking action in the face of obstacles and externalities,116
but may be overwhelmed by the factors weighing against leaving. She has
not made a commitment to making change or taking action;117 ambivalence
and internal hesitation are characteristic of this stage as she struggles with
whether the situation is “bad enough” to necessitate change. As the batterer
engages in seemingly inconsistent behaviors, the survivor may vacillate

110 Mary Ann Dutton et al., Court-Involved Battered Women’s Responses to
Violence: The Role of Psychological, Physical, and Sexual Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 89, 97 (1999) (reporting that in a study of 149 women seeking protection orders,
39.6% met the DSM-IV criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder and 40.1% met the
criteria for acute stress disorder).
111 Id. at 92 (observing that for some women, the impact of psychological abuse is
more severe than the effect of physical violence).
112 Burman, supra note 103, at 41.
113 Id. (explaining that a woman may be experiencing the same level of abuse as in
the pre-contemplation stage).
114 Mahoney, supra note 18, at 5 (“Before the feminist activism of the early 1970s
brought battering to public attention, society generally denied that domestic violence
existed. Now, culturally, we know what it is, and we are sure it is not us.”).
115 See Brown, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that the survivor is more open to
receiving information and feedback in contemplation than in pre-contemplation);
McConnaughy et al., supra note 80, at 369.
116 See infra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.
117 Petrocelli, supra note 101, at 24.
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between feeling that she has reason to be concerned and be motivated to
change, and considering continuing in the relationship unchanged.118
Research shows that three factors affect a battered woman’s decision to
seek help: the severity of the violence, the quantity of resources available to
the survivor, and her perceptions of the effectiveness of the resources.119
Regarding the first factor, as the abuse continues and even escalates, safety
and lethality risks become more apparent, and survivors are more likely to
decide to seek a protection order.120 With respect to the second factor,
women with greater resources who are able to envision multiple ways out of
the relationship may be freer to conceptualize the violence as intolerable.121
Finally, the desire to seek help is influenced by the individual’s prior
experiences with informal and formal sources of help, including family,
courts, police, and domestic violence service providers.122

C. Preparation
The preparation stage is also referred to as the “decision making stage,”
suggesting that the domestic violence survivor has decided she is ready for
change and has committed herself to the effort and challenge of changing the
problem.123 Several shifts in the survivor’s mindset are essential for
movement into the preparation stage, including no longer thinking of the
violence as trivial or as her fault.124 In the preparation stage, the survivor
118 Burman, supra note 103, at 41.
119 Hollenshead et al., supra note 4, at 273 (noting severe abuse may compound

feelings of isolation from helpful resources, which reinforces an inability to end the
violent relationship).
120 See Logan et al., Questions and Conundrums, supra note 70, at 189 (discussing
research results that women seeking protection orders have “severe histories of
violence”).
121 Liang et al., supra note 106, at 75. Women of different races and cultures may
rely on law enforcement or advocacy services to varying degrees. Some research
indicates that African-American women more frequently rely on law enforcement, rather
than available advocacy services. Hollenshead et al., supra note 4, at 277. When AfricanAmerican survivors did use advocacy services, they often utilized advocates to assist with
obtaining a protection order but did not choose to participate in counseling or support
groups. Id. Further examination into the dynamics that deter people from using these
services is warranted.
122 Women who have experienced police indifference or brutality or encountered
mainstream service providers who are not culturally sensitive will not return to these
sources for help. See Liang et al., supra note 106, at 77 (providing examples of Haitian
women and African-American women who experienced a lack of cultural sensitivity or
isolation when seeking help from formal agencies and shelters).
123 McConnaughy et al., supra note 80, at 369.
124 Liang et al., supra note 106, at 74–75.
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seeks others out to reconceptualize the problem and determine possible
actions,125 takes small behavioral and mental actions necessary to accomplish
this change, and prepares for greater action that she anticipates undertaking
in the near future.126 Behaviors during this stage might include leaving the
abuser for a period of time, seeking out safe housing options, talking to a
friend about the abuse, calling a hotline for abuse victims, setting aside
money,127 contacting a legal services office to identify legal options, and
investigating alternative daycare and transportation options as she plans for
ways to protect herself and her children and live independently. A survivor
with greater social support, access to finances, and knowledge of available
legal and non-legal options will have an easier time progressing through this
stage.128 As survivors formulate strategies that fit their unique circumstances
and prepare to carry out a course of action, most survivors greatly benefit
from assistance from advocates.129

D. Action
In the action stage, the survivor is motivated to change the environment
and is engaged in overt behaviors to carry out strategies to protect herself
from future violence.130 Examples of “action” category behaviors include
calling the police,131 leaving home, going to a shelter, seeking a civil
protection order, or fighting back.132 Women have often experienced lengthy
histories of severe abuse before progressing to this stage and seeking a
protection order.133
As researchers examined women’s actions in ending relationship
violence, they were able to pinpoint two keys to moving from preparation
into action. First, the most critical factor that enabled women to end abuse
125 Id.
126 Petrocelli, supra note 101, at 24 (noting that this stage is also referred to as

“decisionmaking”).
127 See Brown, supra note 15, at 12.
128 Burman, supra note 103, at 42–43.
129 See infra Part IV.B.
130 McConnaughy et al., supra note 80, at 369.
131 Domestic violence crimes are largely unreported. Fewer than half of all abused
women ever report the violence to law enforcement. McFarlane et al., supra note 58, at
616 (explaining that relying on police reports for data about abuse severely
underrepresents amounts and levels of violence that women experience).
132 Burke et al., Ending Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 15, at 125.
133 Charles L. Diviney et al., Outcomes of Civil Protective Orders: Results from One
State, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1209, 1215 (2009) (noting that women who obtain
protection orders usually do so only after “they have experienced repeated and severe
violence”).
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was the “single-minded determination that the abuse must end.”134 When
women had reached that conclusion, they were committed to action. Abused
women repeatedly offered the same advice to others in similar situations:
“Don’t let the pattern persist, no matter what.”135 The second most essential
factor was the participation in support groups, through which battered
women gain information, confidence, and the support necessary to end the
abuse.136 Study participants also recommended internal and behavioral
changes, such as leaving the abusive partner, seeking counseling, telling
trusted others, and involving the formal justice system.137
For women who stay in the relationship with their abusive partner, if
there is to be an end to the violence, the abuser must be motivated to change
because whether the abuse persists is dependent on whether he continues to
perpetrate violence and seeks to maintain power and control over the partner.
Some abuse survivors are able to undertake actions to successfully demand
an end to the violence. For example, an abusive partner may fear divorce,
recognize the consequences of violence based on police and legal system
interventions, or observe changes in the survivor that render his measures
futile in maintaining control.138

E. Maintenance
The maintenance stage is seen as a continuation of actions necessary to
sustain the desired change, rather than an absence of transformation.139 This
is an active stage in which the survivor works to maintain her progress and
continues undertaking actions necessary to remain free from violence. The
general guidance that “the maintenance of a change is never to be
underestimated regarding the efforts needed to sustain difficult change and
that adequate maintenance begins with active prevention”140 is especially apt
for domestic violence survivors seeking to end violence. Given the emotional
connection, significance of relationships, and multitude of reasons why
people remain in healthy or unhealthy relationships, it may be very difficult

134 Brown, supra note 15, at 13.
135 Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 Id. at 13.
137 Id. at 14.
138 Id.
139 Petrocelli, supra note 101, at 24; see also Brown, supra note 15, at 14 (defining
maintenance as the stage that occurs after six months of continuous action without
relapse, and noting that while the domestic violence victim has accomplished a change
and is better off than she was in earlier stages, she still must work to prevent a “relapse”).
140 Petrocelli, supra note 101, at 24.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

332

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:2

for a survivor to maintain new behaviors on her own.141 Some survivors will
grieve the loss of positive aspects of the relationship or economic security.
The survivor must also contend with fears of separation assault142 and future
threats of violence, as well as the psychological consequences of trauma,
which include post-traumatic stress symptoms such as hyper-vigilance and
anxiety-producing flashbacks of the violence.143 This stage is especially
difficult for survivors to sustain and is perhaps the hardest stage for the legal
system to grasp. Survivors often benefit from the continued utilization of
support and treatment services and from tangible resources to sustain the
progress of this stage.
An examination of abused women’s creative survival strategies, the
coping mechanisms they regularly employ, and the nature of intimate partner
violence, leads to an understanding of how many women make changes in
their lives to become free from violence. In a quantifiable and systematic
way, the Stages of Change Model illustrates that ending intimate partner
violence is a complex process that occurs over time. The model, therefore,
should have repercussions for how the law approaches domestic violence and
serve as a theory upon which to base and improve interventions into
domestic violence.

IV. PROTECTION ORDER ADVANCEMENTS INSPIRED BY THE STAGES OF
CHANGE MODEL
The identification and naming of the stages is a practice that itself has
acute significance; it fosters conceptual access and raises consciousness
about the survivor’s needs in each stage. With the goal of helping survivors
achieve freedom from violence, the identification of the stages prompts a
host of questions, including: What does a survivor need at each stage to
enable her progression to the next stage? Are there predictable obstacles that
can be preemptively addressed? What is a survivor considering during the
contemplation stage? What information does she need? What preparation
will she engage in? What does she need to be able to undertake such
preparatory steps leading to action? What would she do if she could? How
can she maintain her progress through the stages and once she has achieved
maintenance? Who is best equipped to perform the helping functions at the
various stages? What does the survivor need from the judicial system, law
enforcement, and domestic violence service providers? And how can the
legal system support and empower a survivor or, at the very least, avoid

141 Burman, supra note 103, at 44.
142 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
143 Burman, supra note 103, at 44.
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doing greater harm during any of the stages? These are simple questions to
ask, yet the answering and implementation take effort.
With the recognition that domestic violence survivors commonly go
through the stages identified in the Stages of Change Model and contend
with many barriers in their quest to end relationship violence, improvements
can be made to the legal system designed to intervene in intimate partner
violence. Part IV offers recommendations for the advancement of current
protection order laws and systems in light of this process that abuse survivors
undertake.

A. Judicial Recognition for the Process of Ending Violence
Judges’ persistence in asking, “Why doesn’t she leave?” reveals the
societal expectation that there is an easy answer to violence: just leave. This
seemingly simple solution masks the multiple oppressions domestic violence
survivors face, external and internal constraints to leaving, and the
complexities of relationships and violence. Procedural rules and judicial
practices frequently penalize protection order petitioners for not immediately
leaving and for seeking the court’s assistance multiple times, and even
forestall them from doing so. Petitioners may have multiple reasons for not
pursuing their cases and later need the court’s protection if the violence
continues or escalates. This Section explores the problematic nature of these
procedural rules and proposes reforms.

1. Ending Violence Is a Process
A key tenet of the Stages of Change Model is the principle that any
change is a process. For many abuse survivors, the decision to separate from
an abusive partner is an incremental process,144 or their initial attempts at
leaving are unsuccessful.145 Studies show that, on average, women who
experience intimate partner violence leave the violent partner five to seven
times before fully ending the relationship,146 and often endure years of severe
144 Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 1544.
145 See, e.g., Andrea J. Martin et al., The Process of Leaving an Abusive

Relationship: The Role of Risk Assessments and Decision-Certainty, 15 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 109, 109 (2000) (reporting that half of the attempts of battered women to leave
abusive relationships result in reunion with the abusive partner); James C. Roberts et al.,
Why Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Withdraw Protection Orders, 23 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 369, 369 (2008) (explaining that women’s initial attempts to leave abusive
relationships are frequently unsuccessful).
146 JILL DAVIES ET AL., SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN 79–80 (1998)
(reporting that women leave abusive partners approximately five times over eight years
before leaving permanently); Kathleen J. Ferraro, Battered Women: Strategies for
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abuse prior to seeking a civil protection order.147 When the severity of
violence and injuries increases and the abuser employs greater coercive
control tactics, women are more likely to seek help; employ legal remedies,
such as seeking a protection order; and attempt to leave the abusive
relationship.148
Leaving is one possible act in the action stage, but many survivors who
are in the contemplation and preparation stages enter a legal system where
legal actors expect them to leave the relationship. In reality, when a survivor
seeks a protection order, this is part of a larger course of help-seeking that
includes empowerment, self-direction, gaining information and formal and
informal support, and envisioning change. Even when a petitioner withdraws
her case, she has progressed and may be continuing to address the violence
through support services and actions outside of the legal system. The reality
that it takes many attempts to leave a relationship does not mean that judges
should try to identify a petitioner’s stage or diagnose which victims are really
leaving the relationship. The legal system expects people to use it and to
enter and exit it both quickly and finally; instead, the judicial system must be
available to survivors over time as a resource they can return to, whether they
are staying with or leaving an abusive partner.
Just as with the process of leaving, utilizing protection orders can be seen
as a process that occurs over time, rather than as a singular event.149
Petitioners frequently “drop” cases or request that the court dismiss the case

Survival, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS, CAUSES, AND EFFECTS
124, 133 (A.P. Cardarelli ed., 1997) (noting that women make between five and seven
attempts at leaving before they are finally successful); Martin et al., supra note 145, at
110 (reporting that leaving often involves multiple preliminary separations before the
ultimate permanent termination); June Sheehan Berlinger, Why Don’t You Just Leave
Him?, NURSING, Apr. 1998, at 34, 39 (finding that women leave their abusive partners an
average of seven times before leaving permanently).
147 See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 234 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting that in one study, women filed for
temporary protection orders after experiencing an average of thirteen violent assaults in
the prior year, and in another study, one-third of protection order petitioners were
assaulted ten times or more in the previous three months); Dutton et al., supra note 110,
at 95 (reporting a study of 149 women who were seeking protection orders, which found
72% of the women had previously called the police and 84% had attempted to leave the
relationship two or more times); Logan et al., Questions and Conundrums, supra note 70,
at 189 (finding that protection order petitioners typically have “severe histories of
violence”).
148 Dutton et al., supra note 110, at 101 (finding a strong correlation between the
severity of physical violence and a battered woman’s engagement with the legal system).
149 See Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 427 (recommending that legal personnels’
frustrations with petitioners who return to court multiple times may be decreased if they
understand the context of decisions about protection orders).
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because of respondents’ threats of increased violence.150 Upon filing for a
protection order, which is an outward manifestation of the intent to make a
change in the relationship, petitioners may become abundantly aware of the
danger they face. Leaving or attempting to break free from an abuser’s
control, such as through seeking a protection order,151 is the most dangerous
point in time for someone who has experienced domestic violence. It is now
well understood that there is a high likelihood of “separation assault,”152 that
leaving is a major risk factor for homicide,153 and that women have a wellgrounded fear of increased violence to themselves and their children if they
attempt to leave. Moreover, fear may cause a woman to leave but also to
return to an abusive partner. Multiple clients have remarked to me, “When
there’s a snake out to get you, you want him in front of you where you can
see him, not out in the grass.” Judges, therefore, should take a woman’s fear
of retaliation seriously. Her decision to stay in a relationship is often a
rational choice to prevent her abuser from carrying out his threats against her
and her children if she attempts to leave.
For some other petitioners, filing the petition may cause the abuser to
terminate contact with the petitioner or relocate,154 although this is less likely
150 Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases:

An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
163, 193 (1993) (reporting that in a survey of domestic violence service providers,
“almost nine-tenths (88.8%) of the respondents reported that some petitioners do not
appear for the plenary hearing because the abuser threatens to retaliate if the woman
obtains an order of protection”); Logan et al., Questions and Conundrums, supra note 70,
at 185 (exploring reasons that women do not receive long-term protection orders and
reporting that 35% were talked out of it by the respondent, 11% feared retaliation and did
not pursue the order, 6% reported that her partner had threatened her, and 4% of women
said the respondent had forced his way back into the home).
151 Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 1537–38 (noting that seeking a protection order can
increase a woman’s danger when the batterer perceives the action as a loss of power and
escalates the violence, and identifying the importance of case evaluation, risk assessment,
and safety planning).
152 Mahoney, supra note 18, at 6.
153 Leslye Orloff, Lifesaving Welfare Safety Net Access for Battered Immigrant
Women and Children: Accomplishments and Next Steps, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
597, 617 (2001) (“Women attempting to leave violent spouses are twice as likely to
become victims of homicide than abused women who continue to cohabitate with their
abusers.”); see also Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 274–75 (1995) (“Although
divorced and separated women comprise only 10 percent of all women in America, they
account for three-quarters of all battered women and report being battered fourteen times
as often as women still living with their partners. Divorced or separated men, as opposed
to husbands living with their wives, commit 79 percent of all spousal violence.”).
154 See Roberts et al., supra note 145, at 373 (reporting on a survey of fifty-five
women who were withdrawing the petitions for protection orders they had filed, and
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in cases with high levels of control. Filing for a protection order may also
change the dynamics of the relationship such that the petitioner has leverage
over the respondent by showing her ability to access the judicial process.
Some women place stock in the hope that the abusive partner will change
through counseling or treatment and withdraw their petitions when the
abusive partner enters into a domestic violence treatment program.155 The
emotional attachment of the petitioner to the respondent is also a reason
frequently given for withdrawing the petition for a protection order.156 In
addition, petitions are regularly dismissed because of the inability to serve a
respondent.157

2. Confronting the Continuing Question: Why Doesn’t She Leave?
Despite decades of legal reform, from the moment an abuse survivor
enters the legal system, she is confronted with the question, “Why didn’t you
leave?” Clerks pose this question when they notice allegations that date back
months and years.158 Judges are preoccupied with this question159 and persist
in asking it and variations, such as, “Why don’t they just get up and
leave?”160 and challenging petitioners about why they don’t leave “if the
finding that the most common reason given for withdrawing the petition was a concrete
change by the victim or respondent, such as when either person relocates and the
petitioner no longer feels that the court order is necessary).
155 Id. at 371–74 (discussing the faith that victims of violence place in the success of
domestic violence intervention programs and recommending that “the best resource we
can give these women is information regarding the programs’ questionable
effectiveness”).
156 Id. at 369 (reporting survey results that emotional attachment was the second
most frequently given reason for dismissing a petition for a protection order).
157 TK Logan et al., Protective Orders in Rural and Urban Areas: A Multiple
Perspective Study, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 876, 889 (2005) (finding that lack of
service on respondents prevented petitioners from securing long-term orders in 18–47%
of cases, depending on the jurisdiction).
158 I have witnessed clerks confronting petitioners with the affidavits they were
attempting to file and demanding to know: “We were here three, seven, and ten years
ago. Why didn’t you file sooner?”
159 See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 578–79 (2007) (stating that
judges are preoccupied with the battered woman’s psyche, rather than focusing on the
abuser’s actions); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2488 (1993)
(explaining the degree to which battered women are judged for not leaving and the
problem with this assessment in light of evidence that leaving is dangerous).
160 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1193–94
(1994) (citing Report of the New York Task Force on Women and the Courts, 15
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 32 (1987)).
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abuse is so bad”161 when petitioners stand before them asking to be believed
and seeking the court’s protection. Police officers, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and child protective service workers frequently adopt this posture
and pose this question. Petitioners not only carry the burden of proving
domestic violence in a world that would rather not recognize its existence,
but they also confront the general expectation that an abused person will
immediately and permanently leave the relationship. The law, in fact, often
demands that she must leave.162 For example, many mothers have faced
neglect charges for not leaving an abusive partner; they failed to protect their
children, according to abuse and neglect laws.163
The judgment-laden question is problematic and misguided for multiple
reasons.164 The question focuses attention on the survivor’s responsibility for
leaving and suggests her culpability in the abuse, rather than scrutinizing the
abusive party’s choice of violence or asking why the respondent batters or
why she had to experience the abuse at all. The sentiment that women
provoke the abuse and are to blame persists because it is easier for a factfinder to come to terms with evidence of injury if the violence can be
justified as provoked.165 Some judges disbelieve reports of extensive
161 The Mo. Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report of the Missouri Task Force

on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 505 (1993) (reporting on the commonality
with which judges believe that if the abuse was severe enough, the abuse survivor would
have left, and their explicit expression of this belief from the bench).
162 Judges frequently enter restraining orders in criminal cases when releasing a
defendant after arraignment. The victim/witness may not have knowledge of or a desire
for the order barring contact.
163 See, e.g., In re Michael G., 300 A.D.2d 1144, 1144–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(issuing a neglect finding against a mother when she failed to obtain a civil permanent
order of protection, did not remove herself and her child from the home, and continued to
have a relationship with the child’s father).
164 Shelby A.D. Moore, Understanding the Connection Between Domestic Violence,
Crime, and Poverty: How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women From Leaving
Abusive Relationships, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 451, 456 (2003) (finding the question
misguided because “[t]here is no simple answer to a question with so many
complexities”); see also SHERYL J. GRANA, WOMEN AND (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE COMMON LAW ON WOMEN'S LIVES 139 (2002) (“‘Why doesn’t she
leave?’ is the wrong question to ask. It mystifies. It transforms an immense social
problem into a personal transaction and at the same time pins responsibility squarely on
the victim. It obliterates both the terrible magnitude of violence against women and the
great achievements of the movement against it.”); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of
Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1259 (1996)
(arguing that it is impossible for people to stop asking the question, “Why doesn’t she
leave?” when they deny, ignore, or tolerate violence in their own lives).
165 When representing clients who have endured particularly horrendous violence, I
have seen clerks and judges question petitioners to a high degree about minute
surrounding details. The tired questions about what she was wearing, whether she had
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histories of violence because they cannot fathom that (1) it could happen to
them,166 or (2) they would respond in the same way. In one judge’s ruling
denying a woman’s request for a protection order based on her allegation that
her husband threatened her with a gun, the judge explained, “I don’t believe
anything that you’re saying. . . . The reason I don’t believe it is because I
don’t believe that anything like this could happen to me. . . . Therefore, since
I would not let that happen to me, I can’t believe that it happened to you.”167
The survivor’s failure to leave earlier often negatively affects the court’s
view of her credibility, which can be dispositive in cases that have no
corroborating evidence.
The reactive insistence on leaving makes assumptions about the
simplicity of doing so and fails to recognize the process of change that occurs
as survivors progress through the stages of change, which does not always
occur in a linear manner. It does not account for the multiple ways a survivor
does leave, attempts to leave, or chooses to remain because that seems to be
the safer option. It also fails to leave room for a survivor’s desire to stay in
the relationship, but without the violence.168 The question of leaving is easy
been drinking alcohol, and what she did in response persist. I have always sensed that
these examiners needed to be able to reassure themselves that this could not happen to
them. The judge may also differentiate herself from the petitioner or respondent based on
race, culture, education, age, or class. See generally Martha Minow, Words and the Door
to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665,
1681–82 (1990) (“Perhaps in the face of intimate brutality, observers feel a need to blame
someone as well as a need to explain why it could not happen in their own home; perhaps
these needs produce a tendency to blame victims. It seems easier—less frightening—to
ask why battered women stay in relationships with their abusers than to ask why men
batter.”).
166 Judges may suggest a psychological abnormality or pathology in victims to
convince themselves of the impossibility that this could happen in their own families,
when, in fact, being a woman is the most predictive factor of whether someone will
become a victim of domestic violence, and an examination of the abusive partner’s
history of perpetrating intimate partner violence is telling. See Burke, supra note 159, at
579 (discussing courts’ and society’s preoccupation with a battered woman’s psyche, and
persistence in trying to determine why she did not leave); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 (1991) (“Instead of focusing on the
batterer, [the law] focus[es] on the battered woman, scrutinize[s] her conduct, examine[s]
her pathology and blame[s] her for not leaving the relationship, in order to maintain that
denial and refuse to confront the issues of power. Focusing on the woman, not the man,
perpetuates the power of patriarchy.”).
167 MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS 2–3 (1989).
168 See Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 1499 (concluding that the focus on leaving is
misguided); Id. at 1499 n.70 (“Missing from this picture is a recognition that battered
women should have the choice to remain in a relationship and obtain the legal system’s
assistance to end the violence.”); see also Brown, supra note 15, at 6 (“In addition, a
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to ask, but it is much harder to answer questions of where she will go, how
she will survive, and how she will overcome the challenges and dangers of
leaving.
Leaving assumes there are opportunities for exiting the relationship and
that doing so is the pathway to safety. Barriers to leaving are also reasons for
returning, and an examination of any singular barrier, such as economic
dependence,169 children,170 health-related factors,171 familial and societal
woman may have made critically important changes without having left the abuser.
Staying in the relationship does not mean that the battered woman is inactive or that an
intervention has had no effect on her.”). But cf. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil
Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and Perceptions of Effectiveness, 24 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 688 (2009) (surveying 698 protection order recipients
and finding two primary risk factors for continued violence: stalking and remaining in the
relationship with the respondent after the issuance of the protection order).
169 Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence
Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 22 (2007)
(explaining that a survivor’s inability to be economically self-sufficient is one of the most
difficult obstacles to leaving a violent relationship).
When a victim considers economic hurdles related to a lack of housing, food,
transportation, employment, child care, and medical care, among other monthly expenses,
the prospect of making it on her own may seem untenable. Shelters are only able to serve
a small percentage of the abuse survivors who seek refuge, and temporary housing for
large families or mothers with teenage boys can be virtually impossible to secure. Rural
areas may lack services. If alternatives are unavailable and economic barriers are severe,
there may not appear to be any options for safety.
170 While the most common reason that abused mothers leave a violent partner is
concern for their children’s safety, a common reason for staying is the abusive parent’s
threat to seek and gain custody of their children. Mothers may not leave abusive
relationships because they fear that they will lose custody; that the abusive partner will
kidnap, harm, or even kill the children; or that they will face criminal charges for leaving
with the children. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751–54
(2005) (reciting the facts of the police department’s failure to respond to the mother’s
telephone calls for help when the father kidnapped the children in violation of a
protection order and murdered them later that night); Peter G. Jaffe et al., Common
Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence in Child Custody Disputes, 54 JUV. &
FAM. CT. J. 57, 62–63 (2003) (explaining that courts are often skeptical when a parent
raises allegations of domestic violence when seeking the custody of a child, and further
finding that in 50% of the cases in a study where women raised the concern of domestic
violence with a court child custody assessor, the report of violence was not mentioned in
the assessor’s report to the court).
171 The psychological effects of battering may make it difficult to leave. See JUDITH
HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 86 (1997) (discussing the commonality of posttraumatic stress disorder among abuse survivors). For someone who is disabled or
suffering from illness, the batterer may be the person’s caretaker. A victim may rely on
her partner for health insurance; once abused, she may not be able to obtain her own
health insurance based on the practice of denying health insurance to domestic violence
victims as a “pre-existing condition.” David Gremillion & Elizabeth Kanof, Overcoming
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pressures, gender-role expectations, and cultural or religious mandates or
norms,172 shows the complexities of making such a monumental change and
the expanse of obstacles survivors must conquer.173 Social isolation,174
language barriers, immigration status,175 and lack of information about
available services and legal recourse also affect an abuse survivor’s ability to
seek help. These factors demonstrate the fiction of the ease of leaving,
making the idea of an individual’s choice seem illusory, given the many

Barriers to Physician Involvement in Identifying and Referring Victims of Domestic
Violence, 27 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 769, 772 (1996) (based on doctors’
statements in medical records, some health insurance companies deny coverage to
domestic violence victims based on their “pre-existing” or “high-risk” condition); Carole
Warshaw, Domestic Violence: Changing Theory, Changing Practice, 51 J. OF THE AM.
MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N 87 (1996), reprinted in JOHN F. MONAGLE & DAVID C.
THOMASMA, HEALTH CARE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 133 (2005)
(explaining that battered women have been refused health, life, and disability insurance
based on their higher risk for injury and death). Some survivors lack legal resources that
meet their unique needs, such as survivors of HIV-related domestic violence. Stoever,
supra note 10, at 1157. For other abuse survivors, drug addiction may be introduced by
the partner or the survivor may use drugs as a numbing mechanism. The addiction may
then impede her ability to actively focus on the preparation and action stages and
prioritize escaping violence and living independently. Burman, supra note 103, at 43–44.
172 See generally Liang et al., supra note 106, at 71 (discussing the role of cultural
norms in an individual’s decision to end a relationship with an abusive partner). Women
who have a religious or moral opposition to divorce may not consider leaving the home.
173 See generally Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse
Victims Stay, 28 COLORADO LAWYER 19 (1999) (explaining examples of barriers abused
women face when trying to leave the relationship).
174 As an example of the profound levels of isolation that an abuse survivor may
experience, I represented a client in an immigration case whose husband had told her they
were living in Boston, Massachusetts, when in fact they were residing in an entirely
different part of the country. Everything that she knew of where she was in the world and
the information available to her came through him.
175 With the inadequacy of immigration relief, including recently enacted remedies
under the Violence Against Women Act, an immigrant spouse may feel a legal
dependency on an abusive spouse. There are many reasons related to immigration status
for staying in a relationship. If a victim’s application for adjustment of status is pending,
she may determine to wait out the process. Even the newer immigration remedies
available under the Violence Against Women Act require a lengthy, complex process that
does not always produce positive outcomes. See Anna Gorman, U-Visa Program for
Crime
Victims
Falters,
L.A.
TIMES,
Jan.
26,
2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/26/local/me-crimevisa26. Some remedies are only
available to those who have cooperated with law enforcement and the prosecution of their
abuser, and many women who are fearful of deportation do not employ the formal
criminal justice system mechanisms. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal
Activity, Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014
(Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, 299).
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difficult circumstances any survivor faces and society’s failure to provide
alternatives to the violent home.

3. Changes to Procedural Rules and Judicial Practices to Avoid
Penalizing Survivors for Returning to Court
Survivors typically attempt to end violence through other avenues before
seeking court protection, with 75% of protection order petitioners in one
study reporting that their prior help-seeking efforts had failed or were not
sufficient to manage the violence.176 As violence escalates, battered women
often become more determined to receive a protection order and return to
court. Studies have found that when women experience a greater severity and
longer duration of domestic violence, their awareness that the violence is
escalating prompts them to return to court for the final protection order.177
Research also shows that survivors who previously dropped their petitions
for protection orders are “significantly more likely” to seek and maintain full
orders of protection after receiving the ex parte emergency order.178 These
findings support the proposition that courts should continue to be available as
victims seek help over time, rather than penalizing victims for using the
system multiple times. Especially in light of the dynamics of domestic
violence, safety issues at stake, and complexities of intimate relationships,
the legal system designed to prevent violence should be available for victims’
use.
In some jurisdictions, procedural rules prohibit a petitioner from raising
previously alleged incidents that were dismissed before they were litigated,
thereby overvaluing judicial efficiency at the expense of survivor safety.
Some states have adopted versions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(B), as demonstrated in the District of Columbia Domestic Violence
Unit Procedural Rules, which instruct, “when the petition has been dismissed
more than once, the Court may consider and decide whether the petition
should be dismissed with prejudice.”179 Filing a prior petition that was not
adjudicated is the only scenario the rule identifies as grounds for dismissing a
petition “with prejudice;” it notably does not target abusive litigation tactics
or meritless claims. When an action is dismissed with prejudice, the
176 Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 415–16.
177 Dutton et al., supra note 110, at 91.
178 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 193–94.
179 D.C. SUP. CT. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT R. 10. This is consistent with Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(1)(B), which states, “Unless the notice or stipulation
states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously
dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
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petitioner cannot raise the same allegations in a future petition.180 She must
wait in terror for a new assault or threat before petitioning the court for
protection from violence. The District of Columbia’s rule at least provides
the judge with discretion, unlike the federal rule. State rulemaking bodies and
courts have also applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),181 such that
if a petitioner fails to appear and pursue her case and the respondent moves
to dismiss the action, the dismissal acts as an adjudication on the merits.
However, state courts differ on the application of Rule 41(b)182 and there is a
marked trend away from state conformity with the Federal Rules.183
Restrictive procedural rules make protective orders unavailable to survivors
who need them and, paradoxically, do nothing to eliminate the violence the
domestic violence courts and laws are set up to address. States should rectify
procedural barriers to seeking court protection that stand in the way of
petitioners receiving the injunctive or equitable relief184 envisioned in the
creation of these remedial actions, which were intended to be liberally
construed for the protection of domestic violence victims.185 State civil
180 Hanneman v. Nygaard, 784 N.W.2d 117, 119, 121 (N.D. 2010) (calling a

dismissal with prejudice a “harsh and permanent remedy when it resolves a case on the
merits,” and noting that a judge can exercise discretion to dismiss an action “without
prejudice” and avoid barring a future suit).
181 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.
Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any
dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or
failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.”).
182 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 14.7 (3d ed. 1999) (state courts differ as to whether a dismissal for failure
to prosecute constitutes a judgment on the merits).
183 John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J.
354, 355 (2003) (“Not only has the trend toward state conformity to the federal rules
stopped accelerating—it has substantially reversed itself. . . . Federal procedure is less
influential in state courts today than at anytime in the past quarter-century.”).
184 See, e.g., Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376, 377 (Me. 1990) (“[Protection orders
are] “historically an equitable remedy, very similar to an injunction . . . .”); Emily J.
Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 827, 855 (2004) (identifying protection orders as “injunctions” or a type of
“equitable decree”).
185 See, e.g., Gaab v. Ochsner, 636 N.W.2d 669, 671 (N.D. 2001) (“[The domestic
violence law] is a remedial statute which we construe liberally, with a view to effecting
its objects and to promoting justice. . . . The legislature intended the adult abuse laws to
fill the void in existing laws in order to protect victims of domestic violence from further
harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42
(D.C. 1993) (“The Intrafamily Offenses Act is a remedial statute and as such should be
liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.”).
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procedure rulemaking bodies should decline to adopt Rule 41(a) or (b)
regarding domestic violence matters because the rule is contrary to the
purpose of the protection order remedy. If rulemaking bodies do adopt a
version of Rule 41(a), they can adopt a discretionary rule that permits judges
to dismiss claims with prejudice in limited, identified circumstances, such as
when the defendant proves the petitioner has filed multiple claims with a
vexatious purpose.
Respondents have also sought to use the civil procedure doctrines of
collateral estoppel or res judicata186 in three circumstances that involve
petitioners returning to court to seek protection: (1) when a petitioner re-files
a case after failing to appear in court or dismissing an initial petition; (2)
when the petitioner seeks a subsequent order based on events that occurred
after receiving a previous protection order; and (3) when a petitioner has
vacated an order for protection issued after adjudication and returns to the
court to seek protection based on the prior allegations. In response to the first
category of claims, courts have held that a dismissed protection order petition
does not result in a valid and final judgment on the merits, as required by the
doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata,187 and such defenses are
inapplicable to non-adjudicated domestic violence claims.188 Under the
second category, petitions based on new facts are also not barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel.189 Regarding the third category, under a

186 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982) (precluding
claims when there has been a valid and final judgment on the merits); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact
or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a
suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. As this Court and
other courts have often recognized res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of
the cost of vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” (citations omitted)); see
Eagle v. Johnson, 583 S.E.2d 346, 347 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the doctrine of res
judicata after a full trial had been held on the merits, resulting in the trial court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim for a protection order, and she filed a new petition with identical
allegations the following day).
187 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 182, § 14.7 (discussing how if a
disposition is based on a technical procedural ground, rather than on the validity of the
petitioner’s claim, the judgment is not generally considered to be “on the merits”).
188 See Hanneman v. Nygaard, 784 N.W.2d 117, 119 (N.C. 2010) (finding that a
woman’s second petition for a protection order against her ex-boyfriend, which she filed
after her first petition was dismissed due to her failure to appear in court, was not barred
by res judicata and that she could proceed on prior and new allegations).
189 See, e.g., Clagg v. Clagg, No. 08AP-570, 2009 WL 190049, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that a woman’s petition for a domestic violence civil protection
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variety of factual circumstances, some state courts have rejected the
application of res judicata to protection order cases.190 One example of this
approach is found with courts determining that if a petitioner is experiencing
ongoing fear, even without a new incident of violence, the domestic violence
issues “have not been fully litigated to their finality,” thereby refusing to
construe the law to require additional acts of violence.191 Other courts have
found that “changed circumstances” preclude the application of res judicata
to protection order cases.192 Courts have also noted that unfairness results if
the doctrine of claim preclusion is applied too harshly in the domestic
violence context, and that in “properly seeking to deny a litigant two ‘days in
court,’ courts must be careful not to deprive [the litigant] of one.”193 Similar
to continuing tort claims, courts may also view the ongoing atmosphere of
power and control as part of continuing grounds for a protection order.194
Courts have found multiple exceptions to the application of res judicata for
public policy reasons,195 and domestic violence is precisely the type of
order against her former husband was not barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel
because the new petition relied on facts different from her prior petition).
190 See, e.g., Wolt v. Wolt, 778 N.W.2d 802, 808 (N.D. 2010) (stating that “other
courts have also rejected application of res judicata to the granting of a domestic violence
protection order” and finding that res judicata does not bar entry of a domestic violence
protection order based on the same facts that led to the issuance of a disorderly conduct
restraining order); Sterling v. Sterling, No. 02CA8, 2002 WL 31111778, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2002) (finding that the ex-wife should have been given notice of an
impending dismissal of her domestic violence protection order against her ex-husband,
and because she was not notified of the dismissal, her protection order was properly
reinstated).
191 Muma v. Muma, 60 P.3d 592, 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that the
purpose of res judicata is to ensure the finality of judgments, but that domestic violence
issues are not fully litigated when the petitioner is in current fear of the respondent, and
that any other interpretation would be contrary to the legislature’s intent to prevent
further acts of domestic violence through a protection order).
192 See, e.g., McComas v. Kirn, 105 P.3d 1130, 1135–36 (Alaska 2005)
(determining that a “change of circumstance” precludes the application of the doctrine of
res judicata in a protection order case).
193 Chen v. Fischer, 843 N.E.2d 723, 725 (N.Y. 2005) (alteration in original)
(finding that because a personal injury claim is not sufficiently intertwined with the
dissolution of the marriage relationship, the separate tort action should not have been
barred).
194 See Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 88 (Ill. 2003) (holding that domestic
violence could be considered a continuing tort for the purposes of an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim); see also Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 114 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding statute of limitations for tort claims could be tolled based on
evidence of battered woman’s syndrome).
195 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 182, § 14.8 (providing examples of
desegregation cases and cases involving the rights of Native Americans).
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specialized situation that outweighs judicial economy concerns and for which
a strict application of claim preclusion would undermine legislative
objectives. The positions of these courts reflect a commitment to providing
legal relief to those seeking the court’s protection from domestic violence
when they are most in need. Sometimes, the remedy has to be made available
multiple times to the same litigant—whether she is seeking an order,
modifying an order to more fully meet her safety needs, or even vacating an
order and then petitioning for another order in the future—and this counsels
toward removing statutory barriers to filing and applying procedural
doctrines to fulfill legislative intent.
Judges also commonly deny protection orders to petitioners who have
dropped prior orders or have failed to pursue a full order after receiving a
temporary order.196 Some judges have threatened abuse survivors with
sanctions for repeated use of the court system.197 All too often, judges fail to
recognize the danger the petitioner faces, with one judge saying, “If she
dropped it [once], she’ll do it again and [thus] is wasting the court’s time,”198
and other judges commenting, “Oh, it’s you again,” “How long are you going
to stay this time?” or “You want to go back and get beat up again?”199 Clerks
have also misinformed petitioners that they can only get one protection order
in a lifetime.200 At the time when petitioners are most in need, current laws
and practices may prevent petitioners from accessing the legal system
designed to protect them. To address this problem, state legislatures could
specify the intent to permit repetitive suits for petitioners experiencing
domestic violence.201

196 PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 28 (1990)
(finding that judges are reluctant to grant orders when a petitioner has delayed or
dismissed a prior order); Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 192 n.113 (reporting that
women who have dropped prior protection order petitions often are denied future orders
even if the respondent is a different abusive partner and many years have passed, and
citing a study concluding that a majority of West Virginia magistrate judges consider
petitioners “unworthy” if they have dropped a prior protection order petition).
197 MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 164, at
8.
198 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 192 (alterations in original).
199 MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 164, at
8.
200 Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 40.
201 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 182, § 14.8 (finding that when a
statutory scheme allows for repetitive suits, claim preclusion defenses are avoided).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

346

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:2

B. A Greater Role for Advocacy Support
1. The Importance of Safety Planning: Focusing on Contemplation and
Preparation
The current civil legal response to domestic violence professes to be
focused on victim safety, and police officers, safety advocates, domestic
violence hotline responders, and attorneys tell people who have experienced
domestic violence to go to the courthouse and get a protection order.202 Upon
arrival, these women are funneled through the protection order process. This
practice reflects an assumption that can actually escalate survivors’ risks.
Too often, survivors are not treated as individuals with unique experiences of
violence and safety needs, and are instead deposited into the judicial system
before being counseled about safety concerns and alternative legal and nonlegal options.203 Most jurisdictions do not have domestic violence

202 See, e.g., Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 416 (reporting that in a study of

women who were seeking protection orders, 50% said police encouraged them to obtain
an order while 30% cited other public agencies as responsible for prompting them to
obtain orders).
203 Availing one’s self of the formal legal system is especially beneficial to those
who desire enhanced law enforcement responses or potential criminal penalties.
Following the entry of a protection order, a violation of the order is punishable as a
criminal offense or contempt of court. Police are likely to respond more quickly and treat
the matter with greater seriousness. Protection orders, therefore, offer a level of legal
accountability because police have the right to arrest a respondent if there is any violation
of the order, such as a violation of provisions prohibiting contact that would not
otherwise be criminal, and the petitioner has the ability to determine whether she wants to
pursue a contempt action.
There are, however, multiple alternatives to the formal protection order system that
have been developed by individual communities, though their efficacy has not been
proven. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from
Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1999) (describing the advantages and
disadvantages of Navajo Peacemaking Circles for women’s autonomy and safety and
recommending an informal adjudication process that draws on the strengths of
Peacemaking while correcting for coercive practices); Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny
About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for
Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 522 (2010) (recommending
the development of an alternative track to the civil justice system that would draw on
principles of restorative justice); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness:
Feminist Responses to Violent Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 968, 970 (1998)
(identifying competing tensions of adversarial lawsuits and reconciliation, and describing
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as one model that promotes
healing).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

2011]

FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE

347

advocates204 to perform vital safety planning and counseling functions, and
in the rare jurisdictions that do, the advocates are not routinely housed in
courthouses.205 Almost all petitioners enter the system pro se, and only a
fortunate few are able to obtain counsel after filing their cases.206 A
survivor’s first and only contact before filing a case, therefore, is with a court
clerk who instructs her to fill out forms that initiate a legal action.207 Given
the danger of separation assault, with the majority of homicides and serious
injuries occurring when an abuse survivor tries to break free from the
abuser’s control,208 it is inherently risky to guide a survivor into fast-paced

204 See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-61A-0145 (2009) (“Advocacy-based

counseling means the involvement of a client with an advocate counselor in an
individual, family, or group session with the primary focus on safety planning and on
empowerment of the client through reinforcing the client’s autonomy and selfdetermination.”).
205 Although Washington has a strong advocacy culture, “the overwhelming
majority of courts in Washington State do not have domestic violence advocacy available
on-site,” with only 19% of courts providing any advocacy services. Furthermore, only
29% of courts without advocates provide referrals to community-based domestic violence
resources. JAKE FAWCETT ET AL., NOW THAT WE KNOW: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WASHINGTON STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY
REVIEW 71 (2008).
206 See Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel
in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557, 567 (2006)
(reporting that in civil protection order cases in one Illinois jurisdiction, neither party was
represented in 83.4% of cases); Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se
Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1913 (1999) (stating that, in
the District of Columbia, domestic violence litigants are pro se in 74% of the cases
studied (citing D.C. TASK FORCE ON FAM. L. REPRESENTATION, D.C. BAR PUB. SERVS.
ACTIVITIES CORP., ACCESS TO FAMILY LAW REPRESENTATION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 40 (1992))).
207 See, e.g., KY. R. FRANKLIN FAM. CT. App. 1 (“Monday through Friday, a person
who wishes to obtain an EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE ORDER should go to the Offices
of Family Court and file a DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PETITION. . . . The person
receiving and verifying the completed DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PETITION shall
immediately present the Petition to the Family Court Judge.”); Gondolf et al., supra note
65, at 505 (identifying a court as a “model program” because it trains court staff to assist
petitioners in completing standardized forms and to give an overview of the protection
order process).
Clerks should be prepared to explain the legal process, provide information about
protection orders and the relief available, and offer a list of domestic violence resources,
such as shelters and support groups. Some clerks assist petitioners in filling out petitions,
but safety planning and client counseling is considered beyond the boundaries of a court
clerk’s role.
208 See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
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litigation209 without first introducing a safety planning protocol, connecting
her to community and financial resources, or helping her understand and
weigh the range of alternatives. As beneficial as the protection order remedy
is for many abuse survivors, it may not be what each woman would choose if
she were presented with options, and it can be outright dangerous if entered
into without addressing safety needs.
If the domestic violence response system were attuned to the
contemplation and preparation stages, a commitment to survivor safety and
autonomy would mean having trained attorneys or advocates housed at
courthouses to engage in individualized counseling and safety planning with
abuse survivors before they take legal action, rather than the current norm
that focuses solely on the “action” stage and channels petitioners into
potentially dangerous litigation. The early involvement of an advocate or
attorney trained in domestic violence would enable an abuse survivor to
better progress through the stages of change as she struggles with definitional
questions about domestic violence and seeks out information, resources, and
ways to achieve safety and independence. Many women do not recognize the
range of physical behaviors that are illegal and actionable, such as slapping,
shoving, or pushing,210 with one client commenting to me, “I’ve told you
about the times he used a gun,” unmistakably indicating that she experienced
multiple other less lethal forms of violence. Through conversation, clients
frequently have revelations and identify the many elements of control and
oppression they experienced and label events as domestic violence or rape.
The survivor’s identification of the problem propels her from the precontemplation and contemplation stages into active preparation.
Women’s sense of empowerment and ability to take greater control over
their lives is considered critical to achieving freedom from violence,211 and
an informative and empathic advocacy relationship can foster such

209 Advance reflection is especially important given the speed at which the case

progresses. The speed is essential to provide immediate protections, but the petitioner
should understand that when she files a petition, she will appear before a judge that day,
the respondent could be served as quickly as that same day or the following day, and the
protection order hearing will occur within several weeks. Full hearings are held anywhere
from five to twenty-one days following filing the petition, depending on the jurisdiction.
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. PROTECTIVE ORDER P. 8 (hearings are held within five court days in
Arizona when the emergency order has awarded the petitioner exclusive use of the
home).
210 Arlene N. Weisz, Legal Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors: The Power
of an Informative Relationship, 80 FAMS. SOCIETY 138, 142 (1999).
211 Joanne Belknap & Hillary Potter, The Trials of Measuring the “Success” of
Domestic Violence Policies, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2005) (“Victim
empowerment is probably the most important focal point of any implementation or
continuation of DV policies.”).
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empowerment.212 In a study of abused women, researchers found that
survivors desired more information on judicial options and processes and on
community resources.213 The individualized planning in this trusting, nonjudgmental, and collaborative relationship can help someone realize and
create options for becoming safer, with an attorney or advocate working with
a survivor to explore the outcomes of possible actions, assess which
measures to take based on her specific circumstances and goals, and plan for
her safety around legal events. The logistics of relocating and the complexity
and stress of legal actions can overwhelm any person, as any single event of
relocation, court action, sudden financial volatility, severing a relationship, or
otherwise disrupting social networks is a tremendous life stressor.214 The
current system expects abused women to undertake all of these actions
simultaneously and steadfastly, but does not routinely offer needed support.
Without assistance, abuse survivors report “feeling overwhelmed at a crisis
point while leaving their abusive partner and confused by the maze of
services and choices ahead of them.”215 For as much crisis as someone is in
when she comes to the courthouse, without safety planning that addresses
physical safety, medical needs, financial resources, emotional support, and
ways the petitioner can safely remain connected to her cultural or religious
communities, the petitioner could leave the courthouse facing even greater
danger.
The point at which a survivor seeks a protection order provides an ideal
opportunity to connect her with support services. Research shows beneficial
effects on survivors’ safety and health when they are given advocacy
services, participate in support groups, and receive helping services such as
legal representation, health care, or social services as part of the process of
ending violence.216 Battered women who are given free advocacy services
report experiencing significantly less physical abuse, fewer depressionrelated symptoms, an enhanced quality of life, greater ease in leaving the
abusive partner, and an increased ability to access community services and

212 Alytia A. Levendosky et al., The Social Networks of Women Experiencing

Domestic Violence, 34 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 95, 107 (2004) (emphasizing the
value of an advocacy relationship that creates an empathic, noncritical environment).
213 Hollenshead et al., supra note 4, at 272.
214 Martin et al., supra note 145, at 117–18 (explaining that victims typically
underestimate the stress of such changes, therefore increasing their likelihood of
returning to an abusive partner).
215 Jaffe et al., supra note 171, at 65.
216 McFarlane et al., supra note 58, at 616; see also Burman, supra note 103, at 35
(finding that women who experience intimate partner violence usually benefit from legal
and support services such as legal representation, domestic violence advocacy, crisis
intervention services, support groups, and intensive one-on-one treatment).
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social support, as compared with women without this advocacy support.217 In
general, when abused women are assisted by system actors who are survivorcentered in that they listen and respond to women’s individual needs, these
women are less at risk of re-assault.218 Additionally, disclosing abuse and
seeking the help of formal and informal networks lessens the long-term
impact of domestic violence.219 Advocacy support throughout the court
process addresses survivors’ symbolic and tangible fears regarding seeking
court protection, including fear of the partner’s retaliation, the “intimidating”
nature of the court experience, shame about the reasons for which they are
appearing in court, and prior negative experiences with judicial systems.220
The expense of advocates in the protection order process is justified
based on economic considerations and the benefits of enhanced safety and
welfare of victims. The annual direct costs associated with domestic violence
in the United States exceed $8.8 billion,221 with each incident of intimate

217 Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Reducing Violence Using CommunityBased Advocacy for Women with Abusive Partners, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 43, 43 (1999); see also Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response, supra note
30, at 138 (reporting on a study of women leaving a battered women’s shelter who
received advocacy support from trained college student volunteers for six hours per week
for a ten-week period, and the outcomes of each woman’s progress over a two-year span.
The study found that women with advocates experienced significantly less violence than
women without advocacy support. Women with advocates also experienced less
depression, a higher quality of life, greater ease in exiting the relationship for those who
chose to do so, and a greater ability to obtain community resources and social support.).
Similarly, the positive outcomes associated with participation in support groups
include increased self-esteem and reduced levels of stress, depression, and anxiety.
Hollenshead et al., supra note 4, at 273.
218 Johnson, supra note 40, at 1151; see also JUDY L. POSTMUS & MARGARET
SEVERSON, VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION: EXPLORING WOMEN’S HISTORIES OF
SURVIVAL 57, 132–34 (2005) (A survey of 423 incarcerated and non-incarcerated women
who had experienced victimization during their lifetimes showed that when survivors
have positive perceptions of social support, the sense of self-efficacy, and the utilization
of domestic violence services, they have better outcomes regarding physical health,
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, incarceration, and suicidality.
In contrast, women who encountered barriers while seeking services for abuse had poorer
outcomes in the categories.).
219 Judy L. Postmus et al., Women’s Experiences of Violence and Seeking Help, 15
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 852, 852–53 (2009).
220 Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 418–19.
221 BONNIE S. FISHER & STEVEN P. LAB, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VICTIMOLOGY AND
CRIME PREVENTION, 346 (2010) (reporting the National Institute of Justice finding that
the aggregate annual cost to victims of domestic violence is about $8.8 billion, or $67
billion (in 1993 dollars) when pain, suffering, and lost quality of life is included); see
also Wendy Max et al., The Economic Toll of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women
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partner violence resulting in health care costs of $978 per woman (in 1995
dollars).222 Studies show that protection orders yield substantial economic
benefits to states, with a Kentucky study estimating that protection orders
produced an annual benefit of $85 million per year to Kentucky alone, and
concluding that “for most women, protective orders reduce violence and save
the state millions of dollars of avoided costs.”223 The involvement of
advocates in the protection order process makes a dramatic difference in the
utilization and success of obtaining court protection, with one county in
Washington State reporting a 53% increase in the rates of petitions that were
filed and the numbers of temporary protection orders granted after the
jurisdiction began using trained advocates.224 Importantly, advocacy
involvement results in dramatic safety outcomes, with research showing that
women with domestic violence advocates were twice as likely to experience
absolutely no violence for two years post-intervention, as compared to those
without advocates.225
While the utilization of advocates is currently rare, an examination of
two jurisdictions’ use of advocates can serve as a model. In Washington,
D.C., the organization Survivors and Advocates for Empowerment (SAFE)
employs courthouse advocates to provide crisis intervention; safety planning;
support through the protection order process, including helping petitioners
draft petitions and understand the evidence necessary to obtain a protection
order; referrals for legal representation or social services; and assistance with
emergency housing, food, and transportation needs.226 The starting salary for
an advocate at SAFE is $38,000, and each advocate assists over 500
survivors per year,227 with ten SAFE advocates working with 5,243 victims
in the United States, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 259, 259 (2004) (finding that direct costs
of domestic violence exceed $8.3 billion annually).
222 NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 30, (2003) (reporting the results of a 1995 study by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention).
223 LOGAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 9, 148–49 (finding that protection orders save
the state of Kentucky an estimated $85 million per year, and that, “[r]elative to the toll
that partner abuse takes on a victim’s life, the cost of a protective order is small”).
224 FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 202, at 21 n.24; see also Weisz, supra note 207, at
145 (noting the powerful influence of advocates to survivors’ increased participation in
the legal system, and finding that women who were supported by advocates were more
likely to obtain protection orders and call the police).
225 Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response, supra note 30, at 138.
226 Survivors and Advocates for Empowerment (SAFE), Job Listing: Court
Advocacy Program Advocate (Aug. 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter SAFE, Job
Listing].
227 E-mail from Elisabeth Olds, SAFE Co-Exec. Dir., to author (Aug. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Olds, August 9th E-mail] (on file with author).
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in 2009.228 SAFE estimates that the work of the advocates saves between
$800,000 and $1,000,000 per year in clerks’ time and attorneys’ fees.229 In
King County, Washington, where Seattle is located, the county prosecutor’s
office employs seven advocates who assisted 5,607 protection order
petitioners in courthouses in 2009, with each advocate assisting an average of
800 survivors per year.230 In addition to the services provided by advocates
in the District of Columbia, advocates in King County accompany petitioners
to court and stand with them at counsel’s table to provide information and
support.231 The starting salary for these system-based advocates is $43,338
per year,232 while community-based advocates in the region are paid less.233
In the major metropolitan areas of the District of Columbia and King County,
the cost of advocacy support per victim is $54 to $72.234 Since surveys show
that approximately 1,131,999 domestic violence victims obtain civil
protection orders or restraining orders each year,235 an estimation of the
annual cost of providing courthouse advocacy services to domestic violence
survivors is $60 to $81.5 million.236 This amount is minimal when
considering that annual direct costs of domestic violence exceed $8.8 billion,
and taking into account the violence-prevention outcomes of advocates and
protection orders.237 Depending on a jurisdiction’s volume of protection
order petitioners, the jurisdiction could fund one or several courthouse-based
228 Id.; E-mail from Elisabeth Olds, SAFE Co-Exec. Dir., to author (Aug. 11, 2010)
(on file with author).
229 Olds, August 9th E-mail, supra note 227.
230 E-mail from Sandra Shanahan, Supervisor, Prot. Order Advocacy Project, King
Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, to author (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:06 PST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Shanahan, 10:06 PST E-mail].
231 See SAFE, Job Listing, supra note 226.
232 E-mail from Sandra Shanahan, Supervisor, Protection Order Advocacy Project,
King Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, to author (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:39 PST) (on file with
author).
233 Shanahan, 10:06 PST E-mail, supra note 230.
234 These figures were obtained by taking the total salary of the advocates at each
organization and dividing that figure by the number of survivors served by that
organization. In Washington, D.C., the cost of providing advocacy support to a survivor
is $72.48. In King County, providing an advocate to a survivor costs $54.10.
235 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 12, at iii, 52, 54 (finding approximately
1,131,999 victims of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking obtain
protective or restraining orders annually).
236 This calculation is demonstrative. The overall figures may be reduced by
adjusting for lower salaries for advocates in rural areas. The calculation also only
accounts for petitioners who obtain protection orders, and does not include those who
dismiss their petitions or who seek advocacy services and determine not to file for an
order.
237 See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
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advocates and recognize significant increases in survivor safety and financial
savings as a result.

2. Ongoing Advocacy to End Violence
To sustain abuse survivors in the maintenance stage and effectively
eliminate domestic violence, advocates and attorneys should be encouraged
to return to the roots of the feminist response to domestic violence. Namely,
advocates and attorneys should listen to battered women and then provide
comprehensive, individualized responses to their physical, environmental,
and emotional needs beyond the entry of a court order.238
After filing for or obtaining a protection order in the action stage, many
petitioners urgently need assistance with tangible support239 and access to
material resources240 to alter their vulnerability to recurring violence in the
maintenance stage. In a survey of 423 women, abuse survivors reported the
following services as being most helpful: food banks, subsidized day care,
domestic violence shelters, subsidized housing, welfare benefits, job training,
educational services, unemployment benefits, rape crisis or sexual assault
counseling, and religious counseling.241 These tangible interventions attend
to women’s multidimensional physical and environmental needs, which often
need to be managed before the emotional effects of violence can be
addressed.242 Helping women obtain needed community resources and
increasing their social support aids survivors in overcoming obstacles to
238 See Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction
for Policy and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
479, 482–83 (2005) (“[A]dvocacy studies demonstrate[] a clear and positive impact on
women’s safety. . . . The next step for the battered women’s movement must be to revisit
its roots by refocusing on supporting women and incorporating an individualized
responsiveness into government and community programs.”).
239 Judy Hails Kaci, Aftermath of Seeking Domestic Violence Protective Orders:
The Victim’s Perspective, 10 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUS. 204, 218 (1994) (reporting results
of interviews with 137 women that found that women needed assistance with housing,
employment, child care, their ongoing court cases, and counseling).
240 See Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 95, at 1009–11 (advocating the use of a
“material resources” test in determining whether to adopt various domestic violence laws,
policies, or services).
241 Postmus et al., supra note 218, at 855, 861; see also Cris M. Sullivan, The
Provision of Advocacy Services to Women Leaving Abusive Partners: An Exploratory
Study, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 41, 48–49 (1991) (presenting women with eleven
areas of possible unmet need and finding that the most commonly chosen category was
obtaining material goods or services, and that over half of all women also indicated that
they desired legal assistance, education, transportation, health care, social support,
employment, and services regarding their children).
242 Postmus et al., supra note 218, at 862–63.
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leaving abuse and enhances their overall quality of life. In turn, this
improvement in well-being serves as a long-term protective force against
future abuse.243 Advocates or attorneys can help petitioners locate and secure
tangible support and can work with survivors on multiple fronts, including
housing, resume-building, and financial education, all the while prioritizing
safety and creating opportunities for material resources.244
The maintenance stage can be the most challenging stage for a survivor
who feels lonely or ambivalent, questions her ability to escape from and
prevent violence, or doubts her strength to remain separate from the abusive
partner as she forges a new life apart from what she has known. Severely
battered women are often socially isolated, and when advocates act in an
ongoing emotionally supportive role and provide access to information and
opportunities for escaping violence, it positively affects survivors’ mental
health245 and long-term ability to be free from violence.246 The advocate can
reinforce the survivor’s progress through the maintenance stage, help her
identify tools to sustain her movement, and serve as a steady presence that
encourages the survivor to achieve her goals related to ending abuse.247

3. Legislative and Policy Prescriptions
Based on survivors’ needs during the stages of change, the positive
safety-related outcomes associated with advocacy support, and economic
benefits to the state, states should encourage greater utilization of advocates.
Courts where petitioners can file for protection orders should have domestic
violence advocates on-site to engage in safety planning, which can be
accomplished by hiring advocates or contracting with local community-based
domestic violence programs. For courthouse advocates, state legislatures
243 Deborah I. Bybee & Cris M. Sullivan, The Process Through Which an Advocacy
Intervention Resulted in Positive Change for Battered Women Over Time, 30 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 103, 125 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of securing tailored
resources for individual women); Levendosky et al., supra note 213, at 107 (noting the
positive mental health effects of receiving practical aid).
244 For example, part of financial education, economic stability, and asset-building
might include helping a survivor change bank accounts to decrease the abuser’s ability to
track her location and monitor her finances. Andrea Kovach, Integrating Asset-Building
Strategies into Domestic Violence Advocacy, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 148, 150 (2009)
(describing long-term asset-building strategies, including microloans and individual
development accounts).
245 Levendosky et al., supra note 213, at 95.
246 See Goodman & Epstein, supra note 238, at 484 (finding that intensive advocacy
programs for women have more effective long-term results than treatment programs for
batterers).
247 See Weisz, supra note 210, at 139 (comparing a group of women who received
broad, intensive advocacy services with those who did not).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

2011]

FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE

355

could adopt a description similar to Washington’s survivor-centered
definition of advocacy-based counseling:
the involvement of a client with an advocate counselor in an individual,
family, or group session with the primary focus on safety planning and on
empowerment of the client through reinforcing the client’s autonomy and
self-determination. Advocacy-based counseling uses nonvictim blaming
problem-solving methods that include:
(1) Identifying the barriers to safety;
(2) Developing safety checking and planning skills;
(3) Clarifying issues;
(4) Providing options;
(5) Solving problems;
(6) Increasing self-esteem and self-awareness; and
(7) Improving and implementing skills in decision making, parenting, selfhelp, and self-care.248

Several states statutorily permit victim advocates to assist petitioners in filing
and serving protection order petitions and to accompany petitioners to court
and offer assistance to varying degrees short of representing or advocating
for the petitioner in court. Additional jurisdictions could formally recognize
such roles for advocates.249
Survivors would also benefit from greater numbers of attorneys being
trained in the dynamics and complexity of abuse, the multiple barriers that
survivors face, relevant law, safety planning, and lethality assessment.250
“Domestic violence survivors who are represented by attorneys are
significantly more likely to be awarded civil protection orders than those who
are unrepresented, and their orders contain more effective and complete
relief.”251 While attorneys should be encouraged to fulfill the advocacy roles
described in this section, the small percentage of petitioners who obtain
248 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-61A-0145 (2009). This chapter also identifies
standards for domestic violence shelters and services, including safety requirements,
living standards, and support services that must be provided, and includes laws regarding
confidentiality, levels of training, and the evaluation and enforcement of the standards.
Id. §§ 388-61A-0135, 388-61A-0140.
249 MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
§ 600.2950c(1)(a-c)–(2)
(2009),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(3vzxsa45nxhbdpvcqed2qj45))/mileg.aspx?page=getObj
ect&objectName=mcl-600-2950c (permitting a victim advocate to provide information
about protection orders, assist the victim in the process of filing a petition and serving the
respondent, conduct safety planning, and inform the victim about social services); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.236 (West 2004) (defining “victim advocate” as “a person from
a crime victim service organization who provides support and assistance for a victim of a
crime during court proceedings and recovery efforts related to the crime”).
250 Stoever, supra note 10, at 1218.
251 Id.
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counsel typically are referred to attorneys only after filing their petitions for
protection orders or receiving an unfavorable ruling.252 Advocates stationed
at the courthouse would be able to offer services to all petitioners to provide
individualized support throughout the stages of change, from the essential
safety planning that occurs in the early contemplation and preparation stages
to addressing long-term maintenance needs, such as housing and
employment.
More resources are needed at every level, in terms of attorneys and
advocates engaged in civil advocacy with domestic violence survivors,
community resources, health interventions, shelters, and transitional housing.
Notwithstanding recognition that services by advocates and attorneys and the
availability of safe shelters are essential to escaping violence, funding for
these services has been severely cut in recent years, forcing shelters to close,
organizations to lay off advocates and attorneys, and agencies to scale back
services and turn away survivors in crisis.253 Taking Illinois as an example,
the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence reports that 600 requests
for help go unmet each day,254 and twenty-seven counties in the state
eliminated courthouse advocates who previously had helped petitioners apply
for orders for protection, provided transportation to hospitals and court
hearings, and given referrals.255 These funding cuts dramatically affect abuse
survivors’ abilities to be safe and should be reconsidered.
252 For example, when abuse survivors petition for a protection order in the District

of Columbia, they can request that courthouse advocates refer them to attorneys. Some
petitioners may then be connected with counsel in the two weeks leading up to the final
hearing. See SAFE, Job Listing, supra note 226. In King County, Washington, pro bono
attorneys volunteering with the Bar Association’s Protection Order Revision Squad
represent domestic violence survivors who have been denied protection orders. Emma O.
Gillespie, Family Law Help: A Need So Great, BAR BULLETIN (King Ctnt. Bar Ass’n,
Seattle, Wash.), Apr. 2010.
253 Megan Twohey, Domestic Violence Services See Cuts, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28,
2008, § 2, at 1 (The Victims of Crimes Act is the primary source of federal assistance, but
in 2008, Congress cut the funding to $550 million from $625 million in fiscal 2006.); see
also Mary R. Lauby & Sue Else, Recession Can Be Deadly for Domestic Abuse Victims,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2008, at A23 (reporting budget cuts of $2.1 million to the
Family Violence Prevention and Services Act and the congressional cap on the Victims
of Crime Act, which is funded by fines and penalties by offenders and does not use
taxpayer dollars); NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COUNTS
2009,
at
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nnedv.org/docs/Census/DVCounts2009/DVCounts09_Report_BW.pdf
(reporting the results of the 2009 National Census of Domestic Violence Services
conducted by the National Network to End Domestic Violence, which found that on one
day in America, 9,280 requests for services went unmet, including unmet requests for
emergency shelter, transitional housing, legal representation, and childcare).
254 Twohey, supra note 253, at 1.
255 Id. at 6.
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C. Avoiding Re-victimization While Taking Action in the Civil Judicial
System
One of the most common actions that survivors undertake during the
action stage is to seek civil protection orders, but reports of judicial
mishandling of these cases paint a dramatically different picture from what
legislators intended when they enacted this protective remedy. The following
Section emphasizes the need to ensure that litigants are treated fairly and
avoid re-victimization in the court process, and that judges order
comprehensive remedies designed to address survivors’ safety needs, as
permitted by statute. These recommendations are imperative because of the
safety implications of judges’ words and evidence that judicial treatment of
victims predicts whether they will return to the court system when they need
help in their process of ending violence.256 The experience a survivor has
with the court in the action stage influences whether she will regress or
progress.

1. Judicial Hostility and Resistance to Protection Orders
A woman seeking a protection order in Washington testified about the
grave fear she felt when her ex-boyfriend held a gun to her head, and she
detailed how he persisted in stalking and threatening her.257 He cavalierly
admitted to assaulting her.258 The judge entered a civil protection order, but
warned the petitioner, “If you leave this courtroom and at some point you
initiate contact with him, even if it’s to wish him well . . . [the respondent]
can come back to this court and ask me . . . to terminate it early.”259 Why did
the judge give this warning to the petitioner, who did nothing wrong? Why
did this judge enter the order for only two years, when it is possible to have a
permanent order in this jurisdiction? Why didn’t she order the respondent to
surrender his firearms, as required by federal law260 and permitted by the
state’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act?261 The lethality risks seem
obvious. In a courtroom in North Dakota, a judge rebuked a woman who
returned to his courtroom to seek protection from her abusive partner, saying,

256 See infra notes 270–73 and accompanying text.
257 Recording: Hearing in King County Superior Court (Feb. 4, 2010 at 21:00) (on

file with author).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006) (making it a federal crime to possess a firearm or
ammunition while subject to a qualifying protection order).
261 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.41.800, 26.50.060(1)(k) (2011).
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“If you go back one more time[,] I’ll hit you myself.”262 In yet another
jurisdiction, a judge admonished a battered woman, “I do not want to see you
in here again,” and dismissed the case against her abusive husband.263 In a
Florida court, a woman testified that her husband doused her with lighter
fluid and set her on fire, and the judge responded by singing, “you light up
my wife,” to the tune of You Light Up My Life.264 Judges ask petitioners why
they have remained in the relationship, saying that the abuse could not have
been that bad if they stayed; judges ask petitioners what they did to provoke
their partners to beat them,265 and even ask women whether they like being
beaten.266 Examples of improper, inappropriate, and dangerous statements
and injurious questions by judges abound. These messages of violence or
hostility from judges toward petitioners are not the rare exception, and they
speak volumes about judicial resistance to this system that was designed to
protect victims from further abuse.
Contrast these statements with a litigant’s expectations of what she will
encounter in the civil justice system during the action stage of change.
Numerous clients have excitedly told me, “I’m working toward my
freedom,” expressing their determination and hope that this order will
meaningfully end violence in their lives. Survivors seek protection orders not
only to obtain safety-related relief, but also to break their silence, regain
control over their bodies and lives, and exert control by making the abuse
public and creating the corresponding public record of the abuse.267 They
often seek the formal protection order remedy because they believe the law is
the last recourse for making the abuser listen.268 The survivor expects the
judge to notify the abuser of the illegality of his actions, and hopes to receive
approval and reinforcement from a judge to terminate the violence in a
relationship.269
262 N. D. Comm’n on Gender Fairness in the Courts, A Difference in Perceptions:
The Final Report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts, 72
N.D. L. REV. 1113, 1208 (1996).
263 Rita Henley Jensen, Battered Women and the Law, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 585, 589
(1977–78).
264 SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF FLA., REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 121 (1990).
265 The Mo. Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 161, at 505.
266 Id.
267 Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 420–23.
268 Id. at 420.
269 See, e.g., id. at 427 (“[W]hat seems important for authorities who interact with
battered women is to understand that their primary function may be as communicators
both to women and for women. Battered women need reassurance and support that they
should not have to tolerate violence and emotional abuse in their lives. In addition,
authorities will often need to send this message to the abuser, both directly or through
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While many survivors are impeded from receiving the full protection
order due to the abusive partner’s intimidation and threats of greater
violence,270 another significant reason that women do not leave violent
partners or receive final protection orders is that when they do seek
protection from courts, many are blamed, badgered, and further victimized
through the judicial process.271 Attorneys and advocates routinely report that
judges do not take protection order cases seriously, do not give the
allegations of violence due consideration, and do not convey that abusive
behavior is problematic.272 Judges bring to the bench “a lifetime of exposure
to the myths that have long shaped the public’s attitude toward the
problem;”273 accordingly, over half of respondents in a survey reported that
judges in their jurisdictions are insensitive and disrespectful toward
petitioners.274 Domestic violence laws have significantly improved over the
deliberate and consistent response to women’s requests for legal intervention.”);
McFarlane et al., supra note 58, at 617 (reporting women who sought civil protection
orders viewed “the legal system as a force larger than themselves and as having power
over the abuser that they themselves had lost as a result of the abuse”).
270 Hollenshead et al., supra note 4, at 273 (citing barriers to the effectiveness of
protection orders).
271 MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE CTS., supra note 167, at v–
viii (explaining that petitioners in domestic violence cases are routinely discredited,
blamed, and degraded, and finding gender bias and a lack of understanding of domestic
violence by judges).
272 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 207–09 (One survey respondent reported
that judges “hate orders of protection and try to move those cases in and out of the
courtroom as quickly as possible.”); see also The Missouri Task Force on Gender and
Justice, supra note 161, at 505. The judicial system continues to treat intimate partner
violence as less of a crime than property crimes and stranger violence. For example, in
response to finding that a woman shoplifted a pack of cigarettes, a judge fined her $500
and gave her two years of probation. In the next case this judge heard, a husband had
shattered his wife’s nose by kicking her in the face. The judge fined this man $35. Id. at
510 n.98.
Until recently, judges frequently entered mutual protection orders, or orders against
both parties, even when only one individual had petitioned for protection against the
other. See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 311, 329 (2005). In response to the practice, many jurisdictions enacted statutes that
prohibit mutual orders that have not provided for due process. See, e.g., In re The
Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 317 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that mutual protection
orders may only be issued after each party has met its burden of proving that he or she
faces imminent danger); Pearson v. Pearson, 488 S.E.2d 414, 424 (W. Va. 1997)
(reversing the issuance of mutual restraining orders because there was not evidence in
satisfaction of the statutory requirement for mutual orders that each spouse had abused
the other).
273 Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 39.
274 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 207–08.
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past few decades, but for all of the legal victories, the treatment of the
litigant, case outcome, and comprehensiveness of the relief awarded depend
on the judge assigned to the case.
Judges’ words from the bench carry significant safety implications.
Research shows that when judges give warnings or lectures to respondents
about the seriousness and wrongness of their violence, such judicial
messages can positively impact respondents’ future behavior.275 In contrast,
judges who minimize the severity of domestic violence potentially embolden
respondents. Studies also show that when judges listen to both parties’ sides
of the story, treat litigants fairly and respectfully, and consider the rights and
wishes of the petitioner and respondent, petitioners feel like they have had an
empowering court experience.276 Having this positive court experience
predicts a survivor’s improved quality of life, ability to overcome depression,
and willingness to use the court system in the future as she progresses
through the stages of ending violence.277 It is important to examine the
nature of the victim’s experience in the court system because if a petitioner is
demeaned, intimidated, and ridiculed when she attempts to seek protection
from the court, this response compounds the damage of the violence, and she
will not see the court as a helping place that she can return to if violence
recurs.278
Domestic abuse survivors may feel re-victimized by the court’s response
to the violence for a number of reasons,279 especially when they are blamed
for their own victimization. Some judges determine that the abuse survivor
brought the violence on herself and refuse to enter orders when they find the
petitioner to blame. For example, in Murphy v. Okeke, Mr. Okeke invited
275 Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 43–44 (noting that judicial
affirmations that victims do not deserve abuse help victims gain strength to separate from
abusers).
276 Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Empowerment in the Court
System and Well-Being for Intimate Partner Violence Victims, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 481, 491 (2010) (measuring empowerment through rating statements such as,
“I think the court considers my rights and wishes just as important as his rights and
wishes,” “I feel the court treats me fairly and listens to my side of the story,” and “I got
what I hoped for from filing for a civil protection order”).
277 Id. at 481.
278 Id. at 483 (explaining that if a victim feels ignored or blamed by the judge, this
treatment may make her feel worse than when she initially sought help from the civil
judicial system, and she may not return to the legal system); Kinports & Fischer, supra
note 150, at 207–08 (Survey respondents reported that judges “shame the woman and
scare her [into believing] that she is not going to get the order of protection” and that
some petitioners “don’t return for the second hearing because of the judge’s abusive
behavior.”).
279 Jaffe et al., supra note 170, at 63–64 (identifying the further risk that women and
children may face through litigation, especially when unrepresented).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

2011]

FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE

361

Ms. Murphy to a Fourth of July party at his home.280 When Ms. Murphy
learned of Mr. Okeke’s relationship with another woman, she began to cry
and yell.281 Mr. Okeke responded by yelling expletives at Ms. Murphy,
telling her to leave, and hitting and kicking her multiple times, giving her a
black eye, swollen face, bruises, and cuts on the inside of her mouth.282 She
required emergency medical treatment and missed work because of her
injuries.283 During the civil protection order hearing, the trial judge blamed
Ms. Murphy for “triggering violence” in Mr. Okeke by failing to leave
quickly enough.284 During the companion criminal proceeding, this same
judge stated:
There is no doubt in my mind that if M[s.] Murphy had behaved as a
mature, rational, sober, intelligent adult, that we would not be here today. I
think her behavior was obsessive, I think it was beyond irrational, I think it
was more than immature . . . whatever happened in that apartment, I think
she brought upon herself.285

This judicial attitude is not uncommon; over half of domestic violence
service providers and attorneys surveyed reported that judges make victimblaming commentary during protection order hearings.286
A majority of domestic violence attorneys and advocates report that
judges in their jurisdiction rely on informal rules beyond the relevant statutes
to the detriment of victims of violence.287 For example, some judges create
artificial statutes of limitations to require filing within mere days after an
abusive event occurs. When a petitioner files her petition more than a couple
of days after a violent incident, some judges refuse to issue emergency
protection orders because they assume the delay means that the petitioner is
280 951 A.2d 783, 786 (D.C. 2008).
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 786 & n.4.
284 Id. at 790 (also citing the trial judge’s statement that the protection order statute

was designed to prevent people in relationships “from triggering violence in others”).
285 Id. The court found that because Mr. Okeke was the aggressor and criminally
assaulted Ms. Murphy, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering mutual protection
orders. Id. The court noted that at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge reiterated, “I’m
very sorry Ms. Murphy was harmed by this . . . . I think [her] own behavior brought a lot
of this on her . . . . I don’t think that it’s appropriate to send Mr. Okeke to jail . . . given
the facts in this case.” Id. (alterations in original).
286 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 207–08 (Other survey respondents
reported that judges ridicule petitioners, make the victim “feel like the offender,” use
embarrassing humiliation tactics, and make sexist comments).
287 Id. at 192 (reporting survey results).
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not in danger,288 rather than realizing that she may have been in the
contemplation or preparation stages during this period.289 Fact finders are
dissatisfied when the survivor’s actions fail to comport with how they believe
an abuse victim should behave, reflecting a lack of understanding of the
stages of change, and judges are particularly aggravated when the petitioner
and respondent have had contact with each other. Judges interrogate
petitioners: “Did you call him? Did you go by his house? How did you get to
court today?” The survivor is scolded. She is in trouble for any contact with
the respondent. Even in cases with evidence of severe violence and resulting
injuries, judges outright deny orders when the petitioner has contacted the
respondent, or claim the order will be void in such a circumstance,290
associating this communication with an absence of danger and fear. Such
misstatements of the law create problems particularly when parties have
children in common because petitioners may need to contact respondents
regarding visitation or child support. Other petitioners who are in the process
of ending relationship violence may desire prohibitions against further
assaults or threats and the requirement that the abusive partner enter
batterer’s intervention counseling, but may not be ready to sever
communication and contact altogether. They are statutorily entitled to this
type of tailored order.
While the courtroom experience has the potential to be therapeutic and to
empower survivors,291 with judicial hostility to domestic violence and a
roomful of strangers, the public courtroom may not feel safe.292 The
domestic violence court system, however, is positioned to help a survivor
288 Id.
289 The petitioner may be engaged in safety planning and seeking shelter, may not

know of the legal option, may not easily be able to arrange for childcare, transportation,
or time off work, or may have other reasons for her timing that do not reflect the severity
of the respondent’s threats to her safety. If the respondent is in jail or if the petitioner is
seeking medical care due to the respondent’s violence, filing a court action may not be an
urgent priority. Id.
290 The Mo. Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 161, at 505 (finding that
judges were telling petitioners that the order would no longer be in effect if the petitioner
telephoned the respondent).
291 Stoever, supra note 10, at 1192–95 (describing the therapeutic benefit of
reporting violence to a judicial authority); see also Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 424.
One woman described her experience of empowerment during her protection order
hearing through her comment, “After so long of just taking it and taking it I needed to be
able to show myself as much as show him that I was tired of being a victim. . . . [T]hat
feeling, of fighting back and speaking out, will never leave me.” Id.
292 Logan et al., Questions and Conundrums, supra note 70, at 185 (reporting
findings that one-fifth of women seeking protection orders were embarrassed by the
public nature of the proceedings and that in one jurisdiction, protection order petitions
were published in a weekly newspaper for the community to view).
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progress through the stages of change and end violence, with supportive
judicial responses having positive safety implications and outcomes for
survivors.

2. The Need for Comprehensive Relief in Protection Orders
Legislative histories and appellate case law insist that protection order
laws should be liberally construed293 to provide comprehensive protection294
of domestic violence victims through legal remedies that are readily
accessible and effectively enforced. Such relief is fundamentally intertwined
with victims’ abilities to obtain safety and independence through the court
during the action stage. However, studies of the implementation of such laws
show that judges are not likely to grant many provisions that would make the
orders more practical and that would effectively end violence.295
Judges typically have broad discretion to craft orders,296 but they
frequently fail to award comprehensive relief and enter orders with less
extensive relief than that sought by the petitioner.297 Multiple researchers
293 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A § 4001 (2010) (requiring courts to “liberally
construe” the domestic abuse laws to protect victims of domestic violence and allow
them to “obtain expeditious and effective protection against further abuse,” and for courts
to “promptly” enter and “diligently” enforce court orders); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(a)–
(b) (2010) (instructing courts to liberally construe domestic violence laws to “assure
victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that the law can
provide” and to provide a “speedy” remedy).
294 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(6) (2008) (mandating that Illinois courts
“[e]xpand the civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence; including,
when necessary, the remedies which effect physical separation of the parties to prevent
further abuse”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A. § 4001(4) (2010) (requiring that courts
liberally interpret protection order laws to “expand the power of the justice system to
respond effectively”).
295 See, e.g., Dutton et al., supra note 110; Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150.
296 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 910–14.
297 Dutton et al., supra note 110, at 91. A study of the issuance of protection orders
in three cities shows the frequency with which judges ordered the following common
remedies within protection orders: orders prohibiting the respondent from assaulting or
threatening the petitioner (92%), contacting the petitioner (55%), or coming near the
petitioner’s home or workplace (80%); an order to vacate a shared residence (32%); and
orders requiring participation in domestic violence counseling (25%). Id. When parties
had children in common, the orders contained the following relief: awarding child
custody to the petitioner (80%), requiring the respondent to pay child support (37%), and
denying visitation to the respondent (10%). Id. It is striking that although these courts
frequently awarded child custody to the petitioner, a child support order did not typically
accompany the award of custody. Also striking is the fact that in 8% of cases, the judge
did not award the prohibition against further abuse and assault. Id. One would expect that
this relief would be awarded whenever the judge found that the entry of an order was
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have found “striking and disparate incongruencies between victim requests
and court ordered relief,”298 which suggests that many petitioners do not
receive the help they need in the action stage from the civil protection order
remedy or the relief necessary to maintain freedom from violence. In a
national study, 42.9% of domestic violence service providers reported that
judges are “typically unwilling to consider awarding certain remedies” that
are specifically authorized by statute, such as custody, child support, and
other financial relief.299 Judicial application of protection order laws is,
therefore, frequently contrary to legislative intent that requires courts to:
[s]upport the efforts of victims of domestic violence to avoid further abuse
by promptly entering and diligently enforcing court orders which prohibit
abuse and, when necessary, reduce the abuser’s access to the victim and
address any related issues of child custody and economic support, so that
victims are not trapped in abusive situations by fear of retaliation, loss of a
child, financial dependence, or loss of accessible housing or services.300

The failure to award wide-ranging relief to address violence is further
demonstrated by the results of a study of a random sample of 200 cases in
which protection orders were entered after a finding of domestic abuse from
a domestic violence court considered to be a “model program.”301
Researchers found that only half of the petitioners’ requests for “no contact”
orders were granted by the court, and of those petitioners, only 21% received
orders that completely prohibited contact and did not contain exceptions.302
This finding is remarkable given that the prohibition against contact does not
involve property or child custody. It also reflects the extent to which courts
fail to listen to survivors’ assessments of what they need for their safety,
contrary to the lessons of social science studies that a survivor has unique
insights about what she needs to be safe.303 When parties had children in
common, only 48% of petitioners who requested custody were granted any
form of custody, and only 27% of these petitioners were granted sole
appropriate based on past domestic violence, particularly because this behavior is already
criminal.
298 Yearwood, supra note 31, at 162 (discussing his own study and Edward
Gondolf’s research).
299 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 150, at 205.
300 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2008).
301 Gondolf et al., supra note 65, at 505–06.
302 Id. at 510.
303 D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Battered Women’s Perceptions of Risk
Versus Risk Factors and Instruments in Predicting Repeat Reassault, 19 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 778, 796 (2004) (finding that a domestic violence victim’s
perception of risk is a “reasonably accurate predictor of repeated assault”).
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custody.304 Regarding financial support, only 12% of requests for monetary
support were granted, while attorney’s fees were awarded at a higher rate.305
The general refusal to grant financial maintenance, child support, rental or
mortgage assistance, or temporary possession of property makes it very
difficult for low-income petitioners to create a separate household. Although
federal law requires a respondent to surrender weapons when a protection
order is issued,306 petitioners’ requests for weapons to be confiscated were
only granted in 12% of cases.307
While some judges refuse to require the respondent to stay away from
the petitioner, others do not heed a petitioner’s request for an order that only
prohibits violent contact. The majority of states permit petitioners to select
relief that could allow for the continuation of the relationship,308 such as
merely entering an order that prohibits the respondent from assaulting,
harassing, threatening, or abusing the petitioner, and that requires him to
participate in counseling. Even where such contact is permitted statutorily,
judges may still refuse to enter such tailored orders or may deny any form of
protection altogether.309
To be consistent with legislative intent, judges should be trained on how
to enter individually tailored and comprehensive relief that is responsive to a
petitioner’s particular safety needs. Research shows that when judges deny
valid requests for protection orders, petitioners are subjected to more threats
of violence than those who receive protection orders.310 While the process of
304 Gondolf et al., supra note 65, at 510; see also Yearwood, supra note 30, at 166
(finding similar rates of custody orders).
305 Gondolf et al., supra note 65, at 510–11.
306 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (2006).
307 Gondolf et al., supra note 65, at 511. The rate of confiscation was even lower in
a review of Utah cases which found that judges required respondents to surrender
firearms in only 4.5% of cases where sentencing guidelines were followed. Diviney et al.,
supra note 133, at 1214.
308 Because a petitioner can generally choose which relief she seeks, she can choose
to not request the “stay away” or “no contact” provisions, while electing to seek the “no
assault” and counseling provisions. However, in several states, a civil order that does not
end the relationship is a statutory impossibility. See Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 1504 &
n.110 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28.1 (West 2007) (forbidding defendants from
occupying the same residence as the victim when temporary or final restraining orders
are issued)).
309 See Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process:
Observations on a Court Advocacy Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 606, 622
(2000) (describing a commissioner who refused to grant orders permitting contact
between the parties and who outright denied orders to women who wished to maintain
contact, despite the fact that such orders were statutorily permitted in the jurisdiction).
310 Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice
Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women?, 15 AM. J. FAM. L. 59, 67 (2001).
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petitioning alone has value, as even the women who were denied orders
experienced less subsequent violence than women who did not file for a
protection order at all,311 it is critical to a survivor’s success in the action
stage that orders are entered when merited and that judges enter relief
necessary to end violence. The next section recommends advancements in
training, court observation, and judicial complaint processes to persuade
judges to enter more appropriate orders.

3. Measures for Increased Judicial Accountability
The descriptions of judicial resistance to domestic violence cases
illustrate the need for continuing efforts at judicial education.312 Such
training should consist of information on the dynamics of domestic violence,
including the Power and Control Wheel;313 the Stages of Change Model,
based on the notion that ending violence is a process; external and internal
barriers to ending violence so that judges understand why leaving is not an
easy answer; lethality risks, especially highlighting the dangers of threats to
kill,314 attempted strangulation,315 stalking,316 and weapons in the home;317
protection order laws and the wide range of options available to judges as
they enter remedies; and local advocacy and social service resources. Some
jurisdictions mandate judicial training when judges are first assigned to hear

311 Id.
312 See 42 U.S.C. § 13992 (2006) (providing funding for judicial training under the

Violence Against Women Act); Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 2, at 49
(“[J]udicial training must be targeted toward the eradication of existing anti-victim biases
within a larger framework of promoting procedural justice.”).
313 Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, supra note 78.
314 Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner
Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. FOR JUST. J. 14, 16 (2003) (concluding that the Danger
Assessment study determined that “women whose partners threatened them with murder
were 15 times more likely than other women to be killed”).
315 See Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Nat’l Law Enforcement Policy Ctr., Domestic
Violence—Concepts and Issues Paper (2006), reprinted in NANCY K. D. LEMON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 672, 674–76 (3d ed. 2009) (recommending that agencies adopt
a risk assessment checklist, particularly one with questions regarding strangulation and
choking, because the victim’s risk is often higher when strangulation has occurred).
316 Logan & Walker, supra note 168, at 685 (finding that stalking is associated with
high levels of threats and violence and that it is a “critical risk factor” in post-protection
physical, sexual, and psychological violence and injury, even after controlling for prior
physical and sexual violence).
317 Campbell et al., supra note 314, at 16 (reporting that the Danger Assessment
study found that “when a gun was in the house, an abused woman was 6 times more
likely than other abused women to be killed”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1792695

2011]

FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE

367

domestic violence cases,318 and this is an important beginning. Ongoing
periodic trainings should be held while judges serve this rotation so that
judges can talk to experts about their questions and points of confusion once
they are regularly hearing domestic violence cases in their courtrooms. Such
ongoing education that reinforces the importance and efficacy of protection
orders, the very real challenges of escaping violence, and the significance of
the judicial role could help prevent judicial fatigue and frustration with
domestic violence cases. Ongoing training could also include sessions on
vicarious trauma and burnout.
To hold judges accountable, communities can utilize court monitoring or
“court watch” programs, and court observers, counsel, and litigants can be
encouraged to file judicial complaints when judges make egregious remarks.
Court watch programs have been created in a small number of communities
to track compliance with protection order laws, document judges’ treatment
of litigants, monitor whether judges and prosecutors are handling protection
order violations seriously, motivate judges to change inappropriate or
harmful behavior, and educate the community about how the judicial system
handles domestic violence cases.319 These programs require staff to draft and
publish reports of the collected data and necessitate a sustained commitment
by community, university, and law school volunteers to be a presence in
courtrooms. Gender and Justice Commissions and Judicial Bias Task Forces
were similarly formed in the 1990s with funding from the Violence Against
Women Act.320 Additional reviews of courts continue to be warranted
because, several decades later, the same problems persist.
Current judicial complaint processes do not sufficiently hold judges
accountable to prevent the behaviors described in the preceding paragraphs,
and should be improved to increase their effectiveness. Bad decision-making
in rulings can be corrected through appeal or mandamus, although navigating
this process is an imposing challenge for the majority of domestic violence
petitioners who are pro se and who would be pursuing appeal without the
protection of a court order. Many of the concerns raised in this Article are
318 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68555 (West 2009) (requiring a domestic violence

session as part of the orientation and annual training program for judges hearing domestic
violence matters).
319 See Sarah M. Buel, Family Violence Court Watches: Improving Services to
Victims by Documenting Practices, TEX. PROSECUTOR July-Aug. 1999, at 16, 16–19, 22
(identifying court watch programs as “an effective mechanism to bring about needed
changes in the system”); Stoever, supra note 10, at 1206–07 & n.194 (describing the
judicial accountability benefits of community observation).
320 See generally Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An
Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 50–
55 (1996) (describing the development of the task force movement, its processes, and its
findings, which are briefly summarized as, “they ain’t pretty”).
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issues of judges’ appalling behavior, inappropriate demeanor, bad faith, or
egregious errors, which are categorized as judicial misconduct.321 Attorneys,
however, lack incentives for filing judicial complaints, finding that it would
be contrary to their clients’ interests322 and their own professional
reputations;323 in fact, attorneys rarely file such complaints.324 Pro se
litigants face multiple barriers in making complaints, including a fear of
retaliation, lack of knowledge about actionable behavior, and lack of access
to the complaint process, such that relying on litigants as the source of
complaints is not an effective means of ensuring judicial propriety. The
procedures of impeachment, address, recall, and removal are used
exceptionally infrequently, and private or public admonition, reprimand, and
censure are also rare.325 This author was able to identify only one example of
321 Mary

Ellen Keith, Judicial Discipline: Drawing the Line Between
Confidentiality and Public Information, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2000); see also
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(6) (providing that any justice of the courts may be removed
from office for “willful or persistent violation of rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Texas, incompetence in performing the duties of the office, willful violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or willful or persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with
the proper performance of his duties or casts public discredit upon the judiciary or
administration of justice”); CYNTHIA GRAY, HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT COMMISSIONS 28 (1999) (explaining that Canon 3B(4) of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct regarding courtroom demeanor requires judges to be “patient, dignified,
and courteous to litigants,” and stating that charges of judges being impatient, impolite,
or lacking judicial temperament generate a large portion of judicial complaints); Cynthia
Gray, How Judicial Misconduct Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405, 406 (2007)
(explaining that, across states, grounds for investigation and discipline “frequently
include willful misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute, persistent failure to perform judicial duties,
habitual intemperance, and conviction of a crime”).
322 Samuel K. Benham, Judicial Purgatory: Strategies for Lawyers, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 585, 593 (2010) (reviewing case law and concluding that lawyers find that filing a
complaint for judicial misconduct is not in their clients’ best interests because the
complaints do not affect the outcome of the case that the judge has presided over, and
may enrage the judge and cause the judge to be unsympathetic to the attorney’s clients or
to the clients’ arguments).
323 David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial
Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 933–34 (2009) (“The most obvious disincentive to
complaining of judicial misconduct . . . is the loss of goodwill with the bench. . . . The
potential impact that filing a complaint of judicial misconduct could have on an
attorney’s career cannot be overestimated.”).
324 Id. at 910 (reporting that only one out of every 83,000 licensed attorneys file a
complaint of judicial misconduct against a judge in the United States each year).
325 Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A
Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 386 (2000) (noting that only
200 state court judges were removed from office between 1985 and 1995); Alex B. Long,
“Stop Me Before I Vote for this Judge Again”: Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial
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a judge being sanctioned for bias against domestic abuse victims, which
included “outspoken insensitivity” concerning domestic violence and sexual
assault cases.326 Of the complaints that are filed by attorneys, litigants, or
other individuals, almost all are dismissed,327 and heightened confidentiality
provisions328 protect judges’ reputations while preventing the public from
learning of problematic behavior.329 In sum, current processes tend to value
judicial independence330 at the expense of judicial accountability.331
Accountability should be improved through aggressive and competent
enforcement of judicial rules of ethics, greater public access to the results of
disciplinary investigations and hearings, and semi-annual reports to the
public about judicial misconduct and resulting disciplinary action.332 Court
watch observers can be encouraged to file judicial complaints when there is
cause to do so because such observers are not associated with the litigation
and are uniquely positioned to observe trends in judicial behavior, notify the
presiding judge of highly dangerous judicial behavior, and issue reports to
the public.

Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 19–20, 22
(2003) (describing these processes and barriers to their use).
326 In re Romano, 93 N.Y.2d 161, 163 (1999) (removing the judge from his office
for multiple offenses, including a case the judge presided over in which a husband
assaulted his wife in violation of a civil protection order, and the judge remarked,
“What’s wrong with that? You’ve got to keep them in line once in a while.”).
327 See Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal
Judges Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do
About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439, 439–40, 449 (2009) (identifying ongoing issues following the
implementation of the Judicial Council and Disability Act of 1980. For example, the
chief judge of the circuit makes the initial review of all complaints and may dismiss them
outright.); Keith, supra note 321, at 1404–05 (citing a report finding that, for the years
1997 and 1998, Michigan had a sanction rate of 0.4%, New York 3%, Washington 3.8%,
California 5.1%, Wisconsin 5.3%, Arkansas 5.8%, and Texas 6.3%).
328 Long, supra note 325, at 23 (describing the range of confidentiality provisions
across states’ judicial conduct organizations).
329 Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 363 (2010) (arguing for expanded free speech rights to
allow attorneys to impugn judicial integrity in order to preserve litigants’ access to courts,
due process rights, rights to a competent judiciary, and rights to fair proceedings).
330 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (“For it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”).
331 The strength of the judiciary relies on the public’s confidence that judges are
ethical and fair.
332 Long, supra note 325, at 42, 46–47.
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D. The Challenge of Maintaining Freedom from Violence
Maintaining an end to violence requires much determination and active
work by a domestic violence survivor. Most survivors would benefit from
ongoing economic and advocacy support as they embark on the maintenance
stage of change. Meaningful enforcement of civil protection orders on a
survivor’s terms is also essential to whether the order effectively ends
violence.

1. Substantive Law Changes to Provide Economic Relief
When an abuse survivor leaves her abusive partner, there is a fifty
percent likelihood that her standard of living will fall below the poverty
line.333 Research also shows that with low levels of household income and
high economic dependence on an abusive partner, there is a corresponding
greater severity of violence;334 that economic dependence is the greatest
predictor of a survivor’s inability to end an abusive relationship;335 and that
chronic economic exploitation exacerbates trauma and depression, and
decreases a survivor’s self-efficacy.336 Women seeking protection orders are
frequently dependent on an abusive partner for basic needs such as childcare,
transportation, food, clothing, housing, and medical insurance,337 and
abusive partners commonly engage in economic abuse. They may financially
disrupt or sabotage the victim’s life by stealing her identity,338 making false

333 Orloff, supra note 153, at 617–18.
334 Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.

POL’Y & L. 367, 367 (2003) (citing studies that document that household income predicts
the level of violence in a home).
335 Kovach, supra note 244, at 149 (reporting that economic dependence is an even
greater predictor than safety factors).
336 Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 563, 568 (2008).
337 Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies:
Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 477 (2003) (“A study of women seeking civil
protection orders in Washington, D.C., found that 28% were dependent on their partner
for help with child care, 26% for food or clothing, 18% for transportation, 15% for a
place to live or money for rent, and 5% for medical insurance.”).
338 Kovach, supra note 244, at 148 (providing examples of economic abuse,
including withholding access to financial resources, damaging the survivor’s credit,
accumulating debt, and fraud).
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reports to public housing authorities,339 or turning off the survivor’s
utilities.340 In the maintenance stage, petitioners frequently need immediate
financial relief to enable them to leave an abusive household, meet basic
survival needs, and create a home apart from an abusive partner, but many
state protection order laws fail to make monetary relief available.341 One
survivor’s comment highlights this tension: “The restraining order may stop
the batterer from coming into the apartment, but the legal paper did nothing
to help me pay for the rent, other bills, or food.”342 In light of the many
economic barriers to ending violence and living free from abuse,
opportunities for economic maintenance should be statutorily available in
orders of protection.
Legislatures should follow Delaware’s example343 and amend protection
order laws to explicitly include child support, maintenance, and mortgage or
rental assistance,344 and to immediately cover medical, property, and
339 My clients’ abusers have made false reports to public housing authorities, such

as by claiming that the number of people residing in the house exceeds the limits on the
housing contract or falsely reporting drug activity.
340 Anique Drouin, Comment, Who Turned Out the Lights?: How Maryland Laws
Fail to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence from Third-Party Abuse, 36 U. BALT. L.
REV. 105, 122–25 (2006) (reporting on the frequency with which abuse survivors report
that their utilities have been disconnected by the abuser, and the resulting economic
hardship with reconnection fees and the temporary loss of services).
341 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2.4)(a) (2010) (failing to identify any
monetary provisions in protection orders in Colorado); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(8)
(Supp. 2010) (permitting judges to award costs and attorney fees); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-3 (2004) (including no financial relief in Hawaii’s statute); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 39-6306(f) (2010) (identifying attorney’s fees and service fees as the only monetary
relief statutorily permitted); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(g) (2011) (listing the
forms of relief available in protection orders under Washington State’s Domestic
Violence Prevention Act, with monetary fees being limited to administrative court costs,
service fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, and the cost of electronic monitoring).
342 Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered
Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 238 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1992).
343 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. Ann. 10, § 1045(6), (7) (2011) (permitting judges to order
the respondent to pay “support for the petitioner and/or for the parties’ children . . .
including temporary housing costs,” and “pay to the petitioner or any other family
member monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of domestic
violence committed by the respondent, including medical, dental and counseling
expenses, loss of earnings or other support, cost of repair or replacement of real or
personal property damaged or taken, moving or other travel expenses and litigation costs,
including attorney’s fees”).
344 Most protection order statutes include the option for judges to enter an “order to
vacate” against the abusive partner, assuming the petitioner has some interest in the
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employment expenses directly related to the violence. Currently, many states
do not make monetary relief, other than court fees and attorney’s fees,
available in orders of protection and instead require petitioners to file lengthy
domestic relations actions in the family court.345 In other states, litigants
have sought to have courts determine that child support and other monetary
relief are available in protection orders under provisions allowing for other
forms of relief that are “appropriate to the effective resolution of the
matter.”346 For example, after being denied monetary relief by the trial court
in the District of Columbia, Jacqueline Powell successfully argued to the
appellate court that “she and her children were dependent upon her husband
for support, and this financial dependency was a major factor in the
perpetuation of the long history of violence in the family.”347 She further
asserted that “the only effective remedy given the background of violence
was for the family to live apart from the husband at a place unknown to him,
or alternatively for the house to be made secure both financially and
physically, which remedies required monetary relief.”348 Over twenty years
after Powell v. Powell, litigants in the District of Columbia continue to seek
monetary relief under the “other” provision because the protection order
statute only specifically enumerates “costs and attorney fees.”349 Several
state protection order statutes that do explicitly identify the availability of
spousal support limit this relief to marital relationships legally recognized by
the jurisdiction,350 thereby excluding same-sex and unmarried couples.
Even in jurisdictions where monetary relief is available, many judges
insist that their dockets are too full and refuse to order maintenance and child
support in civil protection order cases, leading researchers to conclude that
property, such as having her name on the lease or having paid rent. This “solution” to
housing is far from perfect, as the abuser now knows precisely where to find the domestic
violence survivor and the petitioner must now bear the cost of the housing.
345 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(g)–(j) (2011) (only permitting
judges to order respondents to pay court costs, attorney’s and service fees, and electronic
monitoring).
346 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(11) (Supp. 2010); Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973,
974–75 (D.C. 1988) (holding that the trial court had authority to order child support and
other monetary relief under the catch-all provision permitting the court to order other
relief to resolve the matter of family violence).
347 Powell, 547 A.2d at 974.
348 Id.
349 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(8) (Supp. 2010).
350 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(4) (2009) (listing temporary spousal
support as a possible remedy); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6341(a), (c) (West Supp. 2011)
(permitting the award of spousal support in civil restraining orders); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-4(6), (7) (2003) (allowing courts to award spousal support “as required by law”);
MO. REV. STAT. § 455.523(2), (4) (2003) (permitting the award of maintenance when the
parties are “lawfully married”).
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“the courts are not willing to address any form of financial compensation for
domestic violence victims.”351 These judges instead instruct petitioners to
file separate domestic relations actions, but the award of temporary or
pendente lite maintenance or child support can take months in the family
court branch. Another significant impediment to relying on domestic
relations cases is that petitioners may not qualify for maintenance or alimony
if they had a romantic relationship but were not married or domestic
partners.352 For unmarried petitioners who are financially dependant on an
abusive partner, the economic hurdles to ending an abusive relationship
cannot be resolved in domestic relations proceedings. The purpose of civil
protection orders is to rapidly provide relief to help a person become safe,
and reliance on lengthier domestic relations proceedings that either do not
satisfy the immediate economic need or exclude entire classes of individuals
leaves many victims without options. Although legislatures have instructed
courts to interpret domestic violence laws to provide protection so that
petitioners’ “lives will be as secure and as uninterrupted as possible,”353 in
order for lives to be “uninterrupted,” economic sustainability is required.
Courts and judicial actors should also proactively publicize the
availability of monetary relief through state crime victims compensation
programs funded by the Victims of Crime Act.354 Every state has a
statutorily created crime victims compensation program for physically
injured victims that provides limited-amount reimbursement for certain
crime-related expenses commonly incurred by domestic violence survivors—
such as medical expenses, lost wages, and counseling expenses—that are not
reimbursed through insurance or other means.355 There are currently,
however, multiple barriers to receiving reimbursement from such programs
that could be statutorily remedied. In addition to crime victims generally
being unaware of such programs, many programs require that crime victims
351 Yearwood, supra note 31, at 165–66 (basing his conclusion on a study that

showed judges granting requests for temporary child support in only 5.1% of cases and
for support payments in 2.2% of cases).
352 D.C. CODE § 16-916(a)–(b) (Supp. 2010) (providing maintenance for spouses or
domestic partners).
353 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.715(1) (LexisNexis 1999).
354 Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIME
VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, http://nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 (last visited Mar.
22, 2010); see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 595.020 (2000 & Supp. 2008) (describing
Missouri’s program).
355 MO. REV. STAT. § 595.015 (2000) (listing potential expenses covered by
Missouri); Crime Victims’ Compensation Program Guidelines, MO. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, http://www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cvc/guidelines.asp (last visited
Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Mo. CVC Guidelines] (stating that there is total maximum limit
of $25,000 per crime victim).
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report the crime to the police within hours of being victimized.356 Programs
also commonly oblige crime victims to cooperate with law enforcement as a
requirement of receiving services.357 Recipients of funds must also not have
“provoked” the situation that led to the injury,358 and survivors with a prior
drug or violent crime conviction may be ineligible for any services.359 There
are scores of commonly incurred expenses that are noticeably absent from
many programs, including coverage for stolen or damaged property,
relocation, mortgage payments or rent, utilities, food, clothing, crime scene
clean-up, tuition reimbursement, and pain and suffering.360 Legislatures
should examine their state protection order laws to consider what further
violence-related expenses should be shouldered by perpetrators of violence,
and jurisdictions can expand coverage of Crime Victims Compensation
programs and reduce barriers to access so that abuse survivors in poverty and
those who are economically dependent on their partners have greater ability
to leave an abusive household.

356 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-810 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring that law

enforcement or judicial records show that the crime was reported within 48 hours of its
occurrence).
357 MO. REV. STAT. § 595.015.6 (2000); Mo. CVC Guidelines, supra note 355
(explaining that the program interprets cooperation to include reviewing mug shots,
pressing charges, and appearing in court to testify).
358 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-810 (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting a victim
from receiving compensation if “(i) the victim initiated, consented to, provoked, or
unreasonably failed to avoid a physical confrontation with the offender; or (ii) the victim
was participating in a crime or delinquent act when the injury was inflicted”); MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 595.025.3(3), 595.035.3 (2000) (requiring consideration of whether the victim
“provoked, incited, or contributed to the [victim’s] injuries or death”); Mo. CVC
Guidelines, supra note 355 (defining contributory conduct to include the victim verbally
inciting the offender, physically inciting the offender, or riding in an automobile with a
person who is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and using a reasonable person
standard); see also Help for Crime Victims: Who Can File, WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT
OF
LABOR
&
INDUSTRIES,
http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/CrimeVictims/FileCoverage/WhoCanFile/Default.asp
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
359 Mo. CVC Guidelines, supra note 355.
360 Mo. CVC Guidelines, supra note 355; cf. Compensation, NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE
OF
VICTIM
SERVICES,
http://www.cvb.state.ny.us/Services/VictimCompensation.aspx (last visited Mar. 22,
2010) (also covering a limited amount of “essential personal property” that was destroyed
in the violence, transportation expenses for medical and court appointments, costs related
to living at a domestic abuse shelter, and costs to secure and clean a crime scene).
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2. The Enforcement of Orders on Survivors’ Terms
While studies show a marked decrease in the levels of violence based on
seeking a protection order, respondents do violate protection orders at high
rates, particularly through re-assaulting or contacting petitioners.361 The
effectiveness of protection orders largely depends on the response by law
enforcement and the judicial system to violations of the order.362 The legal
system, however, frequently fails to appropriately enforce protection orders,
whether through the lack of adequate police response to protection order
violations or the failure of prosecutors’ offices to bring criminal charges. In a
study of Utah’s protection order violations, fewer than half of the cases
resulted in arrest and incarceration, which were statutorily mandated by state
sentencing guidelines for all protection order violations.363 Those who were
incarcerated served very brief sentences.364 When the petitioner publicly
documents the abuse and a judge grants a protection order and tells the
respondent that violation of the order will result in criminal penalties, the
petitioner has a false sense of security and faith that the criminal justice
system will rapidly respond to protect her.365

361 SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION

ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 37–40
(1997) (finding that three months after receiving a protection order, 72% of respondents
reported having “no problem” with the respondent, and after six months’ time, 65%
experienced no problems.); Logan & Walker, supra note 168, at 675, 677, 685 (reviewing
studies of protection order violations showing that a range from 23 to 70% of petitioners
experience protection order violations, and surveying 698 protection order recipients and
finding that three out of five women experienced violations of their orders); McFarlane et
al., supra note 58, at 616 (reporting that in a study of 150 women who sought protection
orders, eighty-one women were granted orders and thirty-six of these women (44%)
experienced at least one violation over an eighteen-month period. The most common
violation was the respondent’s failure to stay a certain distance (200 feet) away from the
petitioner’s home or workplace, and study participants also experienced stalking and
threats of violence.). The range in results between studies is likely due to methodological
differences in how violations are measured. There are especially dramatic differences
between examining police-reported violations and victim self-reports because many
violations are not reported to law enforcement.
362 Diviney et al., supra note 133, at 1211.
363 Id. at 1209 (finding that the majority of defendants were not sentenced in
accordance with federal and state guidelines, and that, in addition to routine deviations
from the guidelines regarding arrest and incarceration, less than one-quarter of defendants
were sentenced to attend the “mandatory” domestic violence intervention program).
364 Id. at 1217.
365 Fischer & Rose, supra note 50, at 417 (reporting that 95% of surveyed women
seeking protection orders expressed confidence that the police would quickly respond to
any violations).
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Important to the maintenance stage and the survivor’s ability to sustain
an end to the violence, several jurisdictions have experimented with holding
compliance reviews or judicial review dockets periodically during the
duration of the protection order. In Rhode Island, for example, courts
routinely hold review hearings in cases where the abusive parent is permitted
to have visitation with his or her child to ensure compliance with the order,
measure the perpetrator’s progress in treatment, and employ a system of
graduated sanctions, as needed.366 Most courts do not currently monitor the
respondent’s compliance with the treatment ordered in a protection order,
such as domestic violence, drug, or alcohol treatment or psychological
evaluations, and it is very difficult for petitioners or counsel to ascertain
whether the respondent is enrolled and participating in the court-ordered
treatment. Judicial reviews would inform the respondent that he will be held
accountable over a period of time, provide greater judicial oversight
opportunities for courts to assess the respondent’s compliance with the
domestic violence order, and give petitioners an opportunity to report
violations in addition to the traditional avenues.
Enforcement is a key element to the effectiveness of protection orders,
and ending violence requires a sustained commitment by the actors in all
systems—legislative, judicial, law enforcement, community advocacy, and
social service systems. It is not enough to simply enter the protection order;
the same judicial system must be prepared to enforce it if a petitioner returns
presenting evidence of violations of the order. The piece of paper that is the
order should represent a greater commitment by the legislative and judicial
systems to supporting a survivor’s efforts and ability to end violence.

V. CONCLUSION
If we as a society take seriously the promise of ending violence, the
administration of protection order laws and systems should reflect a priority
for protecting people from abuse. When domestic violence survivors find
themselves in a system that does not account for common processes of
ending violence and fails to recognize the complexities of domestic violence
and the need for individualized responses, the legal system fails survivors
and may even place them in increased danger.
Courtrooms have the potential to be therapeutic and empowering, and, at
a minimum, a site where the law is applied, but there are multiple examples
of judicial resistance, fatigue, and failure to be alarmed by alarming facts.
The Stages of Change Model teaches that the judicial system’s expectations
should shift to accommodate the fact that ending violence is a process, and
366 Domestic

Violence
Court,
JUDICIARY
OF
RHODE
ISLAND,
http://www.courts.ri.gov/family/domesticviolence.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
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that procedural rules should correspond with this reality. Identifying the
stages a survivor progresses through and the transformational role advocates
can play in helping a survivor move toward maintenance validates the need
for greater utilization of advocates. While the solution to violence often
requires a comprehensive civil protection order, the resolution is not as
simple as a legal order, but also necessitates social and economic support and
enforcement of the order.
The civil protection order remedy has great potential to take the terror
that people experience in their homes seriously and enhance survivors’ safety
and autonomy, making all the difference in a person’s survival. With
procedural and substantive law changes and additional commitment and
effort by the legislative, judicial, and community advocacy systems, the
promise of the protection order can be a reality.
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